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Abstract 
 
This study concerned the piratical attacks occurring along the East and West coasts 
of Africa. Although maritime piracy along the coasts of Africa is not a new 
phenomenon, recent upsurges in piratical attacks have attracted a great deal of 
attention. Despite Nigeria being long considered as the hotspot for piratical activity in 
Africa, the greatest upsurge of piratical activity has been seen in the areas 
surrounding Somalia, including the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean. 
The primary objective of this study is to identify the main causes of maritime piracy in 
Somalia and Nigeria. Also the correlation between state capacity (failed or weak) 
and the motivations for piracy (greed or grievance) is investigated.  
The secondary objectives of this study are to investigate the direct manifestations of 
piracy, as well as the current counter piracy initiatives. This is done in order to 
evaluate the successes and failures of current counter-piracy approaches in order to 
create more viable and successful counter measures. 
It is found that historical factors, as well as political, economic, social and 
environmental factors contribute greatly to the rise of maritime piracy in both Somalia 
and Nigeria. Furthermore, it has been found that there are numerous direct causes 
of piracy in these two countries. These differences and similarities have been 
investigated using a comparative analysis framework. 
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Opsomming 
 
Hierdie studie het betrekking tot die seerowery wat langs die Oos-en Weskus van 
Afrika plaasvind. Alhoewel seerowery langs die kus van Afrika nie 'n nuwe 
verskynsel is nie, het die onlangse oplewing van seerower-aanvalle baie aandag 
geniet in verskeie oorde. Ten spyte daarvan dat Nigerië lank beskou was as die 
probleem-area vir seerower aktiwiteit in Afrika, word die grootste toename van 
seerowery in die gebiede rondom Somalië, insluitend die Golf van Aden en die 
Indiese Oseaan ervaar. 
 
Die primêre doel van hierdie studie is om die oorsake van seerowery in Somalië en 
Nigerië te identifiseer. Die verband tussen staat-kapasiteit (mislukte of swak) en die 
motiverings vir seerowery (gierigheid of griewe) word ondersoek. 
 
Die sekondêre doelwitte van hierdie studie is om die direkte manifestasies van 
seerowery te ondersoek, sowel as die huidige teen-seerower inisiatiewe. Dit word 
gedoen om die suksesse en mislukkings van die huidige teen-seerower benaderings 
te evalueer ten einde meer lewensvatbare en suksesvolle teenmaatreels te skep. 
 
Dit is gevind dat historiese faktore, sowel as die politieke-, ekonomiese-, sosiale- en 
omgewings- faktore baie bydra tot die ontstaan en opbloei van seerowery in Somalië 
en Nigerië. Dit is gevind dat daar talle direkte oorsake van seerowery in hierdie twee 
lande is. Hierdie verskille en ooreenkomste is ondersoek met behulp van 
vergelykende analises.  
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CHAPTER 1 – Introduction & Methodology 
1.1 Introduction 
This study concerns the piratical attacks occurring along the East and West coasts of 
the African continent. Maritime piracy on the coasts of Africa is not a new 
phenomenon. Recent piratical activity in the coastal waters of Somalia has received 
widespread attention from international media. Interestingly, until recently the hotspot 
for piratical attacks in Africa was considered to be in the Gulf of Guinea, or more 
specifically in the coastal waters of Nigeria and the Niger Delta. 
In both Somalia and Nigeria various political, economic, social and environmental 
factors contribute to the rise of maritime piracy. In both countries the political 
situation is dire. Somalia is often described as a prime example of a failed state, 
while bad governance and institutionalised corruption are notable characteristics of 
successive Nigerian governments. Although massive deposits of oil in Nigeria 
generate enormous profits for the state, very little of the oil revenues trickle down to 
the masses, while the absence of a central bank in Somalia is indicative of a non-
existing formal economy.  Clan-based rivalries in both states, as well as tension 
arising between those in control of resources and the masses, fuels the fire of social 
unrest. 
There is a consensus among academics that maritime piracy will only be eradicated 
effectively if the symptoms which lead people to engage in these illegal maritime 
activities have been addressed. The various factors that contribute to the rise in 
piracy did not develop overnight and neither will the situation be remedied easily. It is 
evident that neither country has the structural capacity or the political will to address 
these problems, shifting the responsibility to the international community. The 
primary focus of this study will be to identify the causes of maritime piracy. The 
correlation between state functionality (e.g. weak or failed) and piracy will be 
investigated, as well as the motives behind piracy (whether they are driven by greed 
or grievance). The ways in which these issues can be addressed will also be dealt 
with in this study.  
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As maritime piracy constitute such a big threat to international trade, it is also 
essential to find short term solutions to fighting the threat in order to minimise the 
negative consequences to international trade.  
In order to establish a viable short-term solution for combating piracy, it is essential 
to analyse the patterns, character and nature of piracy in Somalia and Nigeria. By 
expanding our knowledge on piratical attacks in Africa, more effective and efficient 
countermeasures can be taken. The secondary objective of this study will focus on 
the direct manifestations of piracy in these two countries and how the problem could 
be dealt with. Secondary objectives will also include investigating current short term 
solutions to maritime piracy and evaluating its effectiveness. Lastly, the probability of 
maritime piracy escalating in other parts of Africa will be investigated. 
1.2 Literature Study: Common Themes 
Various themes can be identified in previous studies as to the consequences of 
piracy. Also, factors causing piracy, chief of which are political, economic, social and 
environmental issues, can be identified. Furthermore, similarities and differences in 
the nature of piracy can be observed. Various initiatives to combat piracy in Africa 
have also been noted by scholars in previous studies. 
1.2.1 Maritime Piracy 
The most immediate threat piracy poses is to that of the crew members, the vessels 
and its cargo. However, since 80% of world trade is conducted using maritime 
trading routes, the security of goods on these vessels concerns not only shipping 
owners, but consumers as well. Maritime piracy challenges the security of these 
routes. Consequently, the cost of operating vessels along these routes increases. 
Either the insurance cost of the vessels and their cargo increase or the ships have to 
find alternative routes which are often longer, increasing fuel costs and the time it 
takes to deliver their goods (Anderson, 1995:179; Anyu & Moki, 2009:114; Kraska & 
Wilson, 2008:42; O’Meara, 2007:7). This in turn increases the costs consumers have 
to pay for the products (Anderson, 1995:179; Anyu & Moki, 2009:115). 
Although piracy in Africa is concentrated along the regions of Somalia and Nigeria, 
the impact of piracy on neighbouring countries is even more detrimental. Many 
African countries are already impoverished and the increased spending in protecting 
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their own Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) due to a spill over of piracy is straining 
on their economies. Also, vessels are discouraged to enter dangerous zones, and 
often avoid docking at harbours in these regions, depriving countries of a valuable 
income (Anderson, 2010:335). 
States, wary of the instability of the Middle East have sought alternative oil supplies 
in Africa. The disruption of oil supply can have disastrous effects on world 
economies. While piracy in Nigeria threatens the access to and from oil fields, piracy 
in Somalia poses a threat to vessels transporting oil through the Gulf of Aden and 
eventually the Suez Canal (Anyu & Moki, 2009:101,103; Nodland, 2010:192; 
Paterson, 2007:29). A Saudi supertanker carrying 2 million barrels of oil, the Sirius 
Star, which was captured in 2008, illustrates the seriousness of the situation (Anyu & 
Moki, 2009:107). 
1.2.2 Political, Economic and Social Issues 
While Hastings (2009:218) describes Somalia as “the most thoroughly failed country 
in the world”, Kraska & Wilson, (2008:52) proclaimed that Somalia is “the very 
definition of a failed state”. There is a consensus among scholars that the last 
functioning central government of Somalia ended with the ousting of the authoritarian 
leader Mohamed Siad (alternatively spelled “Siyad”) Barre in 1991 (Anderson, 
2010:322,324; Kraska & Wilson, 2009:57). Since Siad Barre’s ousting, parts of 
Somalia have been declared as independent republics and several political actors 
(notably the Somalia Transitional Federal Institution and the Council of Islamic 
Courts) have tried to exercise political control over the country, but with little success 
(Anderson, 2010:324). 
While Nigeria may not be a failed state in the likes of Somalia, it could be considered 
a “weak” state. One of the common characteristics Nigeria share with other “weak” 
states is the endemic, institutionalised corruption that reaches the highest levels of 
society (Paterson, 2007:29; Nodland, 2010:194). Politicians are renowned for 
abusing their political power to gain access to wealth that emanates from Nigeria’s 
oil reserves for personal gain. 
Similar to the political vacuum that exists in Somalia, the absence of a central bank 
for nearly two decades indicates that there was no functional formal economy 
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(Anderson, 2010:322). Although the Central Bank of Somalia was re-established in 
2009, it is yet to ensure a stable economic sphere. Poverty, the lack of employment, 
education and incomes further exacerbate economic problems which increase the 
incentives to partake in piratical activities (Kraska & Wilson, 2009:63). 
The main cause of economic malaise in Nigeria is due to the endemic corruption. 
Although the country has ample resources, most of it is controlled by the political and 
business elites who are only interested in self-aggrandizement. This leaves little 
room for improvement in infrastructure and other services. Moreover, the reliance on 
a single commodity, namely oil, provides for an unstable economic environment. 
The rivalry between clans in Somalia and Nigeria creates much instability. In both 
countries, people are more loyal to their clans than their respective countries. Both 
countries have been plagued by clan wars. In Nigeria access to different 
geographical regions has been the driving force behind the clan wars, while political 
control (and therefore access to resources) has been the main motive for various 
factions (Anyu & Moki, 2009:113; Nodland, 2010:193; Paterson, 2007:29). In 
Somalia some political actors have proclaimed their own independent states, notably 
Somaliland and Puntland, although they are not recognised by other governments 
(Anderson, 2010:324; Hastings, 2009:215). 
1.2.3 Nature of Piracy 
The rise in incidents of maritime piracy along the coasts of Somalia and Nigeria has 
been phenomenal, as can be seen in Maps A and B. In Nigeria the increase in 
petroleum-related activities means that maritime traffic in this region increased (Anyu 
& Moki, 2009:97; Nodland, 2010:191; Gilpin, 2007; Paterson, 2007:28). Although 
piracy in Somalia existed before 2008, since then it has gained a lot of momentum. 
As attacks became increasingly successful and ransoms were paid, a snowball 
effect took place (Anderson, 2010:332). An alternative theory for the increase in 
piracy holds that if piracy is curbed in one region, it manifests in another place. 
Piracy in Southeast Asia was largely contained during the late 1990’s, just before 
piracy escalated in Africa (Anderson, 1995:179; Anderson, 2010:323; Govern & 
Winn, 2008:143; Kraska & Wilson, 2008:44). In a similar fashion, it would be possible 
for piracy to flare up along other African coastal regions if piracy in Somalia and 
Nigeria were contained.  
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In 2003 the IMB advised vessels to stay fifty nautical miles from the coast of 
Somalia. By 2005 the piracy situation in the Horn of Africa has deteriorated and 
vessels were advised to stay more than two hundred nautical miles from the Somali 
coast (Anyu & Moki, 2009:103). This indicates that piracy on the Eastern coast of 
Africa is no longer confined to the coast of Somalia. Reports have shown that attacks 
are spreading throughout the Indian Ocean, as far as the Seychelles and the coasts 
of Oman and India (Apps, 2011:18). In contrast to this, attacks on the West coasts of 
Africa have largely been in the territorial waters of Nigeria, especially the Niger Delta 
region (Nodland, 2010:196; also, see Maps A and B). 
Initially pirates in Somalia claimed they only attacked illegal fishing vessels in their 
territorial waters (Anderson, 2010:327; Kraska & Wilson, 2009:58). Similarly, 
Nigerian Pirates accused oil companies of polluting the environment thereby 
endangering their fishing lifestyles (Anderson, 2010:338; Paterson, 2007:29). 
Although this might have been the case initially, the indiscriminate hijacking and 
looting of all vessels indicate otherwise. It is common for Somali pirates to capture oil 
and merchant vessels, vessels which have no interest in Somali maritime resources. 
In Nigeria piracy is not only limited to the vessels of multinational oil corporations, but 
even local fisherman are targeted (Paterson, 2007:29). 
Differences exist between pirates in the two countries in obtaining their objective 
once the attacks have been completed. The objective for Somali pirates is purely 
economical in nature, therefore holding the captured vessels for ransom is common. 
Violence is not often employed since the safe return of vessels and their crew is 
important during the bargaining for ransom (Anderson, 2010:337; Anyu & Moki, 
2009:108; Govern & Winn, 2008:135; Hastings, 2009:219). In Nigeria attacks seems 
to be not only economically motivated, but political as well. Violence is often 
employed to achieve their goals. Although crew members or foreign nationals are 
often captured for ransom purposes, ships are often only looted and not held for 
ransom (Anderson, 2010:338; Nodland, 2010:197; Paterson, 2007:29). 
Numerous incidents in the preceding paragraphs indicate that although piracy in both 
countries might have originated in response to the legitimate grievances of the 
citizens, the line has sometimes been crossed and greed has often become the 
dominating motivation for piracy. The greed versus grievance theory suggests that 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
6 
 
conflict is either motivated by people wanting to relieve their grievances, often 
arriving from real or perceived injustices, or their participation in conflict is motivated 
by their will to improve their material wellbeing (Collier & Hoeffler, 2000:2). 
The sophistication of piracy in both states has steadily increased as their tactics 
have evolved and as newer technologies become available to mass markets (Anyu & 
Moki, 2009:97; Kraska & Wilson, 2008:41). The increasing use of mother ships have 
enabled Somali pirates to conduct their attacks further from the shore, as well as 
enabling them to stay at sea for longer periods of time. The use of modern 
powerboats affords the pirates manoeuvrability and speed, which most vessels lack 
(Anyu & Moki, 2009:108; Govern & Winn, 2008:131; Hastings, 2009:219). What is 
more, the increasing access to arms has increased their firing power vis-à-vis 
maritime vessels which are mostly armed with non-lethal deterrents (Anderson, 
2010:322; Anyu & Moki, 2009:113; Govern & Winn, 2008:135). 
Since the terrorist attacks in the United States of America in 2001, scholars have 
become increasingly aware of the terrorist threats posed in all industries, including 
the maritime industry. Specific focus is placed on radical Islamic terrorists. Not only 
could terrorism harm international trade, but attacks on oil supplies through the Suez 
Canal and Nigeria could be disastrous for most economies (Luft & Korin, 2004:64; 
O’Meara, 2007:5). In 2000 two incidences were recorded where speedboats, laden 
with explosives, were crashed into US Navy vessels in the territorial waters of 
Yemen in apparent suicide attacks (Luft & Korin, 2004:64). Although one cannot 
deny the threat posed by Islamic terrorists if they were to get involved in piracy, there 
have only been isolated cases of maritime terrorism and a definitive link between 
piracy and terrorism cannot be made (Anyu & Moki, 2009:116). 
1.2.4 Piracy Countermeasures 
Ransom demands being met, as mentioned earlier, contributes to the escalating 
piracy, specifically in Somalia. Ransom amounts have steadily increased from tens 
of thousands to millions of dollars. Ship-owners, faced with the possibility of losing 
their crew, vessel and cargo, have given in to the demands of pirates (Anyu & Moki, 
2009:104). However, this sets a dangerous precedent, spurring would-be pirates on 
to reap similar rewards. This further exacerbates the piracy problem, increasing the 
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danger to other crews and their vessels (Anyu & Moki, 2009:110; Kraska & Wilson, 
2009:64). 
International naval presence in the Gulf of Aden and waters surrounding Somalia is 
well-documented. The International naval presence consists of states from the 
developed (Denmark, France, Germany) and developing (Malaysia, India, Iran) 
world, in co-operation with the multinational coalition, the Combined Task Force 151 
(Anyu & Moki, 2009:118; Kraska & Wilson, 2009:55). These forces have been 
ineffectual in meeting stated aims as the waters they must patrol are so vast (Anyu & 
Moki, 2009:118; Kraska & Wilson, 2008:41). Pirates often hijacked ships and sailed 
them back to the territorial waters of Somalia and navies were unable to take further 
action. The Transitional Federal Government of Somalia however, has via UN 
Resolutions given foreign navies permission to pursue pirates into their territorial 
waters, since they have no capacity to protect these areas (Hastings, 2009:218; 
Kraska & Wilson, 2008:48). 
In Nigeria, the international community has taken a different approach. Foreign naval 
vessels are a rare sight in the Gulf of Guinea. Instead, high value has been placed 
on regional security initiatives, such as the recently re-established Coast Guard 
Network for the West and Central African region (MOWCA). These initiatives are 
often assisted by other major international actors (Kraska & Wilson, 2009:62; 
Paterson, 2007:31). This assistance includes training, technical and material support 
(Gilpin, 2007). Numerous countries in the Gulf of Guinea has also benefited from aid 
and training programs distributed by the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM), 
an institution which aims to promote American national security objectives in Africa 
(Nodland, 2010:202). 
The rising incidences of piracy along the coastal waters of Somalia and Nigeria are 
an obvious indication that not enough is being done in order to curb attacks. Many 
ship-owners have investigated alternative means to protect their crews, vessels and 
cargo. An alternative solution would be the use of private security companies to 
ensure their safety (Anyu & Moki, 2009:119; Kraska & Wilson, 2008:42; O’Meara, 
2007:7). The use of such services has been rare though, since armed security 
personnel will likely have to face charges relating to mercenaries if they were 
arrested (Govern & Winn, 2008:145). 
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Shipping companies have largely avoided arming the crew members of vessels due 
to legal restrictions and the possibility that violent situations could increase (Govern 
& Winn, 2008:145). Non-lethal methods of deterring piratical attacks, such as 
increasing the speed, water hoses, barbed wire surrounding the perimeter of the 
vessels and electric fencing have been used (Anyu & Moki, 2009:119; Govern & 
Winn, 2008:144; Luft & Korin, 2004:65). 
A last option which many maritime companies are hesitant to use, is finding 
alternative routes for their vessels to avoid potential dangerous zones. In the case of 
ships traveling through the Suez Canal it is possible to reroute ships around the 
Cape of Good Hope, but the nature of maritime activity in the Gulf of Guinea makes 
it difficult to avoid dangerous areas. The drawback of this option is the increased 
costs involved. Although insurance costs might be less, increase in fuel usage and 
the time it takes to deliver goods would increase operating costs (Anyu & Moki, 
2009:115; Kraska & Wilson, 2008:42; Luft & Korin, 2004:66). 
1.3 Methodology 
1.3.1 Problem Statement 
Maritime piracy poses a great threat, both short- and long term, to international 
maritime trade. Since maritime trade is such an integral part of international trade, all 
countries and consumers will be affected negatively. 
In order to combat maritime piracy in Somalia and Nigeria, the root causes of piracy 
needs to be identified. This includes the political, economic, social and 
environmental issues that influence actors to engage in piracy. Furthermore, by 
investigating the link between state capacity (weak, failed, etc.) and the motives 
behind piratical behaviour (whether pirates are motivated by greed or grievance 
factors) we can more accurately address this phenomenon. This will aid in 
developing and formulating viable long term solutions to piracy. Also, the likelihood 
of piracy, once curbed in these areas, spreading to other coastal areas on the 
African continent needs to be investigated. 
Short term solutions are necessary to ensure the safe supply of goods and 
petroleum through these regions in order to minimise the immediate effect on 
international trade. By familiarising ourselves and expanding our knowledge on the 
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direct manifestations of piracy, more effective counter measures can be taken. This 
is essential to formulate viable short term solutions to combat piracy. 
1.3.2 Objectives and Aims 
In order to formulate viable long term solutions to combat piracy in Somalia and 
Nigeria, it is necessary to investigate the root causes of piracy in these two 
countries. Investigating the political, economic, social and environmental causes of 
piracy in these two countries will be the primary objective of this study. Also, the 
correlation between state capacity (weak, failed, etc.) and the motives behind 
piratical behaviour (whether pirates are motivated by greed or grievance factors) will 
be investigated. 
Secondary objectives will include investigating the physical manifestations of piracy. 
Establishing the modus operandi of pirates will enable relevant actors to establish 
viable short term solutions to combat piracy. Lastly, the likelihood of piracy spreading 
to other parts of Africa will be investigated. 
1.3.3 Research Design and Methods 
This study will be of a descriptive nature, falling under the broader term of qualitative 
research. Furthermore, a thorough study will be done of the root causes and 
motivations of piracy, as well as the patterns, character and nature of piracy in these 
regions, before recommendations for feasible solutions can be made. 
This study will take an inductive approach. Thus, there will be no initial hypotheses. 
Instead, the necessary comparisons regarding differences and similarities of the 
causes of piracy will be done, before formulating hypotheses. Specific focus will also 
be placed on the relation between failed/weak states and piracy, as well as whether 
pirates’ motives are driven by greed or grievance factors. A comparative approach 
will be taken to analyse the findings of this study. 
1.3.3.1 Sources of Data 
This study will make use of secondary data. Useful sources include the International 
Maritime Bureau (IMB), a specialised unit of the International Chamber of Commerce 
(ICC), which provides up to date and accurate data regarding piratical incidents, as 
well as annual piracy reports. This source is used extensively by academic and 
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media publishers for their information regarding piracy. Published academic and 
media articles will also be used. 
1.3.3.2 Time Frame 
In order to contextualise the current situation, it is necessary to have a 
comprehensive overview of the history and development of these countries. 
Therefore, a starting parameter will not be defined. However, it is necessary to limit 
this analysis to the end of 2010. This is due to the constantly changing dimension of 
piracy. The latter parameter was chosen to prevent the continuous revision of data.   
1.4 Conclusion 
This study concerns piratical activity along the East and West coasts of Africa. 
Although piracy is not a new phenomenon in Africa, recent upsurges in the areas 
surrounding Somalia and in Nigeria have received renewed attention. 
Preliminary insights from the literature review suggest that numerous political, 
economic and social factors have an influence on the causes of maritime piracy in 
these regions. Furthermore, a basic understanding of the nature of piracy as well as 
current countermeasures has been established. 
The first section of this study will deal with the theoretical aspects of this study, 
including the defining “piracy”, the comparative analysis framework being used and 
the greed and grievance debates concerning piracy. 
Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 will comprise of the case studies of piracy in Somalia and 
Nigeria, respectively. These two chapters will briefly focus on the history of the two 
countries before discussing the causes of maritime piracy in the respective regions. 
The modus operandi of pirates as well as the current counter piracy efforts in these 
two countries will be investigated. 
A comparative analysis of the two case studies will be done in Chapter 5, focusing 
on the differences and similarities between piracy in Somalia and Nigeria. This 
chapter will also compare the physical manifestations of piracy in these two countries 
and investigate the current measures to deal with the issue. 
Chapter 6 will conclude this study with a brief overview of the research and findings. 
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CHAPTER 2 – Piracy & Theory 
2.1 Historical Perspective 
Popular culture often romanticises pirates of yesteryear. They are frequently 
portrayed as outcasts who nobly have to fight “the system” in order to survive. The 
most famous of these included Blackbeard, Calico Jack and Captain Kidd, among 
others. More recently, famous pirates like Captain Hook and Captain Jack Sparrow 
have graced the silver screens and added to the disillusionment people have of 
pirates. In reality however, pirates have looted and pillaged, murdered and raped, 
and brought about insecurity in maritime trade routes, gaining them the status of 
“enemies of all mankind.” Furthermore, the act of piracy has long been considered 
as a universal crime (Campbell, 2010:20). 
Historically, the most active time for pirates in Africa was during the 17th and 18th 
centuries. During this period, pirates were mostly active in North Africa and the 
Indian Ocean, and to a lesser extent in West Africa. 
Piracy flourished during the 17th century in North Africa in the region that was 
referred to as the Barbary States. The Barbary States typically included Morocco, 
Algeria, Tunisia and Libya. Technically, the “pirates” that operated in this region were 
privateers. Privateers, as oppose to pirates, were given permission from their 
governing authority to attack foreign vessels. However, during this period the major 
European powers of the time refused to recognise the authority of the rulers of these 
states. Consequently, they viewed all maritime vessels that originated from these 
countries that conducted warfare as pirates (Konstam, 2008:76). 
The chief motivation behind attacks of these pirates was looting and robbing of 
foreign ships. Later however, these pirates turned to the slave trade as their main 
source of income (Konstam, 2008:90). By the 18th century, the Barbary pirates 
largely abandoned the slave trade and focus more on extorting protection money 
from traders in the region. The American Navy succeeded in stemming piracy in this 
region by negotiating peace treaties with the various rulers (Turner, 2010:167). 
Eventually, the colonisation of these states by the major European powers during the 
19th century largely eliminated piracy in this region (Konstam, 2008:94). 
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The latter part of the 17th century saw the rise of piracy in the Indian Ocean. The 
trading routes between India and Europe were becoming increasingly busy. This was 
largely due to the increasing demand of goods from the East, especially spices 
(Konstam, 2008:249).  
At that time, Navies of the major European powers were occupied with pirates in 
other areas, notably around India and the Arab states, and could not effectively 
protect their ships in the vast Indian Ocean (Konstam, 2008:251). Furthermore, 
pirates could easily find refuge along the East coast of Africa, especially in 
Madagascar. Madagascar was an ideal location to launch attacks against ships that 
travelled between Europe and the East who navigated around the Cape of Good 
Hope (Konstam, 2008:266). 
By the 19th century, piracy around the coasts of Africa and in the Indian Ocean was 
effectively eradicated. The resurgence of piracy only came about after the Second 
World War (WW2). The post WW2-era saw a decrease in size of many countries’ 
navies which meant their naval capabilities was limited. Also, numerous countries 
were unable to patrol their own coastal areas, let alone the high seas, due to a lack 
of financial resources. In addition, the rapid advances made in technology in the 
post-WW2 period has allowed modern day pirates access to radios, navigation 
systems and high-performance boats, which has made piratical attacks easier 
(Konstam, 2008:304). 
2.2 Definitions 
2.2.1 Piracy 
The most commonly used definition of piracy is as defined by the United Nations 
(UN). The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) defines the 
term as follows: 
(a) “any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, 
committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or 
a private aircraft, and directed: (i) on the high seas, against another ship or 
aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft; (ii) 
against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction 
of any State; 
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(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft 
with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft; 
(c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in 
subparagraph (a) or (b) (United Nations, 1994).”  
Although this definition is used often, it has a major drawback. According to this 
definition, attacks on maritime vessels can only be considered piratical if the attacks 
take place “on the high seas.” Most attacks however, takes place within 200 nautical 
miles of most countries thus falling within the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) and 
sovereign territory of the respective countries and not on the high seas (O’Meara, 
2007:3). 
What is more, acts are only considered piratical in nature if they are “committed for 
private ends”. Therefore, committing attacks on maritime vessels to achieve political 
goals would not be considered piracy (O’Meara, 2007:3). 
The International Maritime Bureau (IMB), a specialised unit of the International 
Chamber of Commerce (ICC), has a broader definition: 
“Piracy is an act of boarding any vessel with the intent to commit theft or any 
other crime and with the intent or capability to use force in the furtherance of 
that act (O’Meara, 2007:3).” 
In multinational institutional bodies such as the UN, definitions will tend to be broad, 
so as to accommodate as many actors as possible. However, in autonomous private 
entities, such as the IMB, definitions tend to be too narrow due to the specific use the 
definition is applied for. Therefore, in order to compensate for this, I will define 
maritime piracy as follows: 
Maritime piracy involves private citizens launching offensive acts from one 
vessel against crews or property of another vessel in territorial or international 
waters. These acts can be considered piratical in nature irrespective of their 
personal or political agenda. Piratical acts include, boarding, extorting, 
hostage taking, kidnapping for ransom, murder, robbery, sabotage, seizure or 
intentional shipwrecking. 
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Unlike navies or coastguards, private citizens cannot exert force legitimately, 
therefore the specific reference to “private citizens”. Also, as mentioned, a great 
number of attacks on crews and vessels happen close to the coasts and not 
necessarily on the high seas. 
It should be noted that mutiny, the act where sailors take over control of the ship 
from the captain, is not considered piracy under this definition. Therefore specific 
reference is made of two vessels being involved. If this was not the case, a 
passenger on a passenger liner, who stole from a fellow passenger, could be 
labelled as a “pirate”, which would not be accurate. 
Although it is hardly ever the case in Somalia, attacks on vessels in Nigeria and 
specifically the Niger Delta is often done to further political goals. Active militant 
groups in the Niger Delta include the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger 
Delta (MEND) and the Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force. This definition 
however, still deems politically motivated acts as “piracy” due to the offensive and 
disruptive nature of the action. Additionally, these actions, irrespective of their 
political agendas, hinder the operations of crews and vessels. However, political 
motives with regards to Jihad are omitted from this definition (see following section). 
2.2.2 Maritime Terrorism 
Since the September 11 attacks in the USA in 2001 by Al-Qaeda, renewed attention 
has been paid to all forms of terrorism, including maritime terrorism. Of particular 
interest is radical Islamic terrorism. Terrorism can be described as the use of 
violence to further political aims. Therefore, maritime terrorism would be politically 
motivated acts in the maritime environment. Thus, this study will not deem maritime 
terrorism, with jihadist motivations, as piracy. 
Preliminary insight into piracy in Somalia indicates that economical, rather than 
political motives are responsible for the piratical attacks. Although political 
grievances might be the motives of groups such as MEND and the Niger Delta 
People’s Volunteer Force, ideologically (i.e. religiously and politically), they do not 
share the same goals as radical Islamic groups such as Al-Qaeda. Therefore, 
political motives related to Jihad should be considered a factor apart from other 
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political motives. And as indicated earlier (see page 6), conclusive links between 
Islamic terrorism and piracy is yet to be found. 
2.3 Comparative Analysis 
One of the aims of a comparative study is to compare similarities and differences 
between different actors or situations. The advantage of this is to gain a greater 
perspective, or a “bigger picture” of the situation. By comparing two or more case 
studies, one can gain greater insight into certain phenomena, as well as explaining 
certain hypothesis. Explaining certain social phenomena and arriving at 
generalisations is the ultimate goal of comparative studies (Caramani, 2008:4). 
Traditionally, nation states and their governments were considered to be the main 
actors in the political sphere. Therefore, the actions, inactions and policies of 
governments were considered to be the main variables in comparative studies 
(Caramani, 2008:6).  Given that the field of comparative politics originated in 
Western-scholarly circles, the focus on states and incumbent governments is natural 
due to the encompassing role these actors perform in these political systems. 
However, just as the field of comparative politics evolved post-WW2 to include non-
Western forms of governance, it once again needs to evolve in the post-Cold War 
era to include other non-governmental actors (Caramani, 2008:7). 
In numerous cases, states and incumbent governments are no longer the most 
important political, economic or social actors in their respective environments. 
Additionally, non-governmental actors often transcend the boundaries of nation 
states. Increasing technological advancement and increasing integration of political, 
economic and social interactions between actors in the international sphere has 
allowed non-governmental actors to engage in functions that were traditionally 
performed by states. These actors include non-governmental organisations, 
multinational corporations, armed groups and criminal organisations, among other. 
In Africa, the rise of non-governmental actors who performed tasks traditionally 
reserved for states came about for various reasons.  Chief of which was the 
illegitimacy, inefficiency and inadequacy of incumbent regimes. Often, this was a 
direct result from weak post-colonial political institutions, as well as the increasing 
laissez-faire attitude governments adopted in line with Structural Adjustment 
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Programs (SAPs) proposed by international financial institutions (Bratton, 1989:408-
410). Also, people often had a greater loyalty towards their respective clans than to 
their governments. Governments could no longer provide the necessary services to 
their citizens. Therefore, citizens looked towards other actors that could fill particular 
vacuums (Bratton, 1989:411). This was especially the case in African countries, 
including Somalia and Nigeria.  
The last functioning central government of Somalia, which was recognised by the 
international community, was that of Mohamed Siad Barre, which collapsed in 1991. 
Since then, citizens have relied on warlords and other regional actors for providing 
services that is traditionally considered to be the domain of the state, such as 
security (Bradbury, 2008:47). Similarly, in Nigeria, citizens have increasingly relied 
on groups such as MEND to voice their political, economic, social and environmental 
grievances towards companies involved in the oil-extraction industry in Nigeria. 
Institutionalised corruption in Nigerian political structures prevents governments of 
taking effective action against companies who does not act in a responsible manner 
(BBC, 2011). 
Thus, it is evident that nation states and their incumbent governments are no longer 
the only important actors in domestic and international spheres. Contemporary 
comparative analyses need to take into account other relevant actors as well 
(Neethling, 2010:93). In accordance to this, this study will not only focus on 
government or state actors, but other relevant actors as well. 
2.4 Greed and Grievance 
Numerous theories exist to explain the phenomenon of civil war. One of the most 
prominent of these theories is the one developed by Collier and Hoeffler (2000). 
Their theory suggests that economic considerations, i.e. greed, motivates civil war, 
as oppose to motivating factors arising from political, economic, social or 
environmental grievances. 
Although the greed versus grievance theory in their study is specifically applied to 
civil wars, the core principles of their theory (whether greed or grievance is the 
principle motivation behind conflict) can be applied to various forms of conflict and 
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more importantly, the actors involved in the conflict (Murshed & Tadjoeddin, 
2009:88). 
As previously mentioned, actors involved with piracy in both Somalia and Nigeria 
claims to be acting in a piratical manner due to injustices they have suffered. And in 
both cases their claims have some legitimacy. In the case of Somalia, illegal fishing 
by other countries in their territorial waters is a reality, thus depleting their natural 
resources without compensating them. In the case of Nigeria, the environmental 
damage caused by the oil drilling and leaking oil-wells has caused considerable 
environmental degradation and a rapid decline in fish stocks, which threatens the 
livelihood of the local populace. Also, citizens of the Niger Delta feel that they are not 
adequately compensated for the petroleum resources extracted from the region.  
Yet, in both of these case studies, pirates have attacked vessels indiscriminately, not 
only foreign fishing vessels or oil tankers. Therefore, this study, looking at the root 
causes of piracy, will use these two concepts to identify whether piratical attacks are 
motivated by greed or grievance. 
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CHAPTER 3 – Case Study: Somalia 
3.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to give a brief overview of the political, economic and 
social issues that shaped modern Somalia. These events provide significant insights 
in the rise of maritime piracy in Somalia. 
Somalia is situated in east Africa, bordering Djibouti to the northwest, Ethiopia to the 
west and Kenya to the southwest. The northern parts of the country borders on the 
Gulf of Aden, while the eastern and western parts faces the Indian Ocean (see Map 
C). This entire coastline stretches more than 3000 kilometres. The population of 
Somalia is almost 10 million with the capital, Mogadishu, the most populous. 
Contrary to most other African states, the homogenous people of Somalia were 
divided during the Scramble for Africa resulting in numerous ethnic Somalis spread 
out in different countries. A democratic form of governance was created upon 
independence in 1960 but was replaced by military rule after one decade. After the 
exodus of the long-time military ruler Mohammed Siad Barre in 1991, the country 
was left without an effective central government upon which numerous political 
actors vied for control over different parts of the country. The political actors vying for 
political power evoked clan loyalties in order to garner support. 
The economy of Somalia relied heavily on foreign aid after independence. Due to the 
lack of natural resources and developed industries the economy relied on foreign aid 
in order to be sustainable. One of the few natural resources that sustained the 
economy, the abundant fishing industry, was often threatened by over fishing 
especially by illegal commercial fleets.  
Although piracy in Somalia waters is not a new phenomenon, the acts of piracy have 
greatly increased since 2008. Due to the geographical position of the country along 
the Gulf of Aden, one of the busiest maritime trading routes, it has become a great 
threat to international maritime trade. 
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3.2 Background 
3.2.1 Colonial Occupation 
Contrary to most other countries in Africa, Somalia is ethnically homogenous. Unlike 
most other African countries where colonial powers created artificial states consisting 
of numerous different ethnic groups, the largely homogenous population of Somalia 
was split up between different colonial powers (Britain, France, Italy and Abyssinia, 
also known as Ethiopia). 
The primary interest of the main colonial powers during the 19th century was to 
control the Horn of Africa. Strategically, it was important so as to protect the trading 
routes between Europe, Asia and the Far East, and even more so after the Suez 
Canal opened in 1869 (Bradbury, 2008:25). Additionally, Britain wanted to safeguard 
the mutton-trade between Somalia and Yemen, since British troops were stationed in 
Yemen (Lewis, 2008:30). 
By the late 19th century the Somali people were divided into 5 different sections by 
the colonial powers. The area surrounding Djibouti was controlled by the French. 
The British controlled the section that is currently known as Somaliland (with 
Hargeisa as capital), while the Italians occupied the east and east-western part (with 
Mogadishu as its capital). The other two sections which were located in the Northern 
parts of Kenya and the Eastern parts of Ethiopia were controlled by Kenya (which 
was a British colony) and Ethiopia, respectively (Lewis, 2008:29) (see Map C). 
All of the colonial rulers aimed at creating a bordered centralised state within their 
respective territories. However, each of them had their own style of ruling which 
would leave marked differences between the territories after independence. They 
had developed different administrative systems, as well as security and financial 
systems – they even had different official languages (Bradbury, 2008:32). 
The Italians were more active in Italian Somalia, e.g. having Italian expatriates in 
Mogadishu governing the country and actively promoting joint agricultural ventures 
between the locals and the expatriates (Lewis, 2008:30). The British however, did 
not develop a colonial administration. British Somaliland had no colonial population 
or valuable resources to protect. The strategic importance British Somaliland played 
vis-à-vis trading routes through Aden and later the Suez Canal only marginally 
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increased their willingness to govern. Instead, a system of indirect-rule was present, 
where British officials signed various treaties with the different clans in the area 
(Bradbury, 2008:24,25). 
Shortly before the Second World War (WW2), Italy invaded and annexed Ethiopia, 
as well as the Somali region of Ogaden that was under Ethiopian control. However, 
after the Allied victory over the Italians, Haile Selassie was reinstated as the ruler of 
Ethiopia. He was also rewarded with the Ogaden area and the Italian colony of 
Eritrea (Lewis, 2008:33). 
After the Italians were defeated in WW2, Italy lost her colonies and Italian Somalia 
was placed under the British administration. Later however, Italy regained control of 
their former colony, but Italian Somalia was administered by the Italians under UN 
Trusteeship (Lewis, 2008:32). British Somaliland gained independence from the 
Queen in June 1960 and Italian Somalia’s independence followed shortly thereafter 
in July 1960. On the 1st of July 1960, former British Somaliland and Italian Somalia 
united to form the Somali Republic (Lewis, 2008:33). The duality of their colonial 
legacies would prove to complicate cooperation within the new republic. 
3.2.2 Independence (1960-69) 
The dual colonial legacy that the newly formed Somali Republic inherited was only 
one of the challenges the newly independent state had to deal with. Some of the 
other challenges Somalia faced included a largely uneducated populace, a 
politicised clan system, poor economic performance, hostile neighbours (notably 
Ethiopia) and weak institutions (Abdullahi, 2007:42,43). Furthermore, the British and 
the Italians as well as the UN realised the prominence of the economic problem and 
donated generous amounts of financial aid to assist the new government (Lewis, 
2008:34). 
Initially citizens of both the former colonies were optimistic about the unification. The 
earlier excitement quickly faded when the authorities of the two former regions 
experienced problems with the amalgamation of the two territories and their 
institutions. The distance between the capital of former British Somaliland, Hargeisa, 
and the new capital of Mogadishu increased this strain (Bradbury, 2008:33). 
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Less than a year after the unification, friction between citizens of the two former 
colonies became evident. In 1961 a referendum was held in order to approve the 
provisional constitution of the new republic. The voter turnout of the former British 
Somaliland was low, and almost half of them rejected the union (Lewis, 2008:35). 
One of the clans that had considerable influence under British colonial rule, the Isaq, 
now only had minor influence in the new government. This affected the relationship 
within the new Somali Republic (Bradbury, 2008:33). 
Despite this, the new democratic government survived. However, clan loyalties 
prevailed and nepotism, corruption and economic decline prevailed. One of the ways 
in which the new state tried to instil Somali nationalism, as appose to clan loyalties, 
was to propagate the annexation of other Somali territories that was occupied by 
Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti (see Map D). This eventually led Somalia to a closer 
relationship with the Soviet Union in order to procure military assistance (Abdullahi, 
2007:43). Between 1963 and 1967 Somalia had to contend with two conflicts – one 
between guerrilla groups in Kenya and one between Ethiopian forces (Lewis, 
2008:37). 
By 1969 Somalia had their third democratic election within the first decade of 
democracy and was hailed by the West as an example of a successful African 
democracy (Bradbury, 2008:34). The 1969-election however, was marred by 
corruption and the election was rigged. After the election, all the elected members of 
opposition parties crossed over to the ruling party, effectively turning the republic into 
a one-party state (Abdullahi, 2007:43). 
Shortly after the election, the newly elected president, President Abdirashid Ali 
Sharmarke, was assassinated by one of his bodyguards. Before the parliament could 
elect a new leader, the military became involved and took control of the government 
in what has been described as a “bloodless revolution”. For the next two decades, 
the country would be run by Major-General Mohamed Siad Barre (Bradbury, 
2008:35). 
3.2.3 Mohamed Siad Barre (1969-1991) 
As with the earlier years of the democratic government, the government of Siad 
Barre also initially enjoyed widespread support from Somalis. Improved economic 
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performance, more social services and less nepotism and corruption ensured 
support for Siad Barre’s regime (Abdullahi, 2007:43). In addition, citizens could relate 
to and approved of the military government’s rhetoric regarding anti-imperialism, pro-
Islam and pro-Marxist-Leninism (so-called Scientific Socialism) (Bradbury, 2008:36). 
However, the suspension of the constitution, banning of opposition parties and 
increased clampdowns on political dissidents largely turned the populace against the 
military government. Furthermore, the execution of ten prominent Islamic scholars 
and prosecution of numerous others who opposed Siad Barre’s regime affected its 
popularity negatively (Abdullahi, 2007:44). Apart from his oppressive authoritarian 
rule, numerous other factors also contributed to the demise of Barre’s regime. Chief 
of which includes his renewed pan-Somali ambitions, the 1974-75 drought, the 
refugee crises of 1978-1980, general economic failure due to dwindling aid supplies 
and ultimately the civil war of 1988. As we will discuss later, many of the causes of 
maritime piracy in Somalia can directly be linked to these issues. 
3.2.3.1 Pan-Somali Ambitions 
Mohamed Siad Barre’s regime initially enjoyed great support. This support was in 
part due to his renewed efforts to reunite all the Somalis that were situated in 
Ethiopia and Kenya. 
One of the remnants of the conflict between Somalia and Ethiopia during the 
democratic regime was the establishment of the Western Somali Liberation Front 
(WSLF). The WSLF actively fought for the reunification of Somalis living in the 
Ogaden area of Ethiopia (Lewis, 2008:43). Shortly after Emperor Haile Selassie of 
Ethiopia was overthrown in 1974, Siad Barre decided to take advantage of the 
political instability and launched a military attack in support of the WSLF in 
reclaiming the Somalis and the Ogaden area (Bradbury, 2008:38). 
Although the Soviets initially supported Somalia, they switched sides. Since Ethiopia 
was the regional superpower, the USSR thought Ethiopia to be the better ally. With 
the support of the USSR and their military resources, the new leader of Ethiopia, 
Mengistu Haile Mariam, soon overpowered Somalia’s forces (Bradbury, 2008:39). 
This humiliating defeat is commonly noted to be the end of Siad Barre and his 
regime’s popularity (Abdullahi, 2007:45; Bradbury, 2008:39; Lewis, 2008:44). Not 
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only did the conflict affect Siad Barre’s popularity negatively, but it also proved to be 
a huge economic burden on the state, which was largely financed by foreign aid. 
3.2.3.2 1974-1975 Drought 
One of the foremost scholars on Somali history, I.M. Lewis, contends that the 
drought in Somalia had a great impact on social and political life during the mid-
1970s (Lewis, 2008:62). Since the majority of the population were subsistence 
farmers, the death of most of their livestock due to the drought had a devastating 
impact on their lives. 
Assisted by financial aid, the military government managed to resettle these 
pastoralists in state farms and fishing villages. Some farms consisted between 20-
30,000 people and largely relied on irrigation and mechanisation (Lewis, 2008:63). 
These villages placed a great economic strain on the government. 
After the drought, a great number of people, especially men, returned to their 
nomadic lifestyles. However, a great number of people remained in these villages, 
relying rather on a constant supply of fish for their survival than an unpredictable 
pastoralist lifestyle (Lewis, 2008:64). Thus, the fishing villages created a sizable part 
of the population that relied on maritime resources for their survival. If, as later 
happened, the survival of these communities were threatened by illegal fishing in 
their territories, Somalis had legitimate cause for being distressed. This issue will be 
discussed in greater detail later. 
3.2.3.3 Refugee Crises 1978-1980 
One of the consequences of the Ogaden War, in which Somalia supported the 
WSLF in reuniting the Ogaden with Somalia, was the great outpour of refugees from 
Ethiopia into Somalia. By the end of 1980 it was estimated that almost one out of 
every four people in Somalia was a refugee. Ironically, these “refugees” considered 
themselves Somalis, thus being refugees in their own home country (Lewis, 
2008:65). 
Despite the generous amounts of financial aid that the Somali government received 
annually, the huge influx of refugees placed a strain on the economy that was 
already destabilised by the drought of 1974-1975. What is more, the refugee camps 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
24 
 
proved to be a useful resource for anti-government forces to recruit young males for 
their cause. Groups such as the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) and the 
Somali National Movement (SNM) would later launch attacks against the military 
regime (Lewis, 2008:67). 
3.2.3.4 Economic Failure, Reduction of Financial Aid 
From the preceding three sections, it is evident that Somalia’s economy, which was 
largely sustained by foreign financial contributions, was increasingly struggling. The 
conflict with Ethiopia, the drought and refugee crises stretched the government’s 
budget to the limits. The level of foreign aid Somalia received becomes evident when 
one consider that, between 1972 and 1989, they had the highest number per capita 
beneficiaries of aid in Africa (Bradbury, 2008:42). 
During the Cold War, Somalia’s strategic position on the Gulf of Aden and the Red 
Sea ensured continued support from opposing sides of the Cold War. Somalia first 
received aid from the USSR and after the USSR allied with Ethiopia, the US and Italy 
(Osman, 2007:101). 
Unlike the USSR, the Western powers often had conditions attached to their aid. 
One of these that was particularly crippling to Somalia’s economy, were the 
Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) proposed by the International Financial 
Institutions. These SAPs aimed at liberalising the economy by implementing 
structural reforms such as deregulating the economy and privatisation (Bradbury, 
2008:42). 
As the Cold War came to an end, the US had less incentive to give foreign aid to 
Siad Barre’s regime. Since the Cold War ended, Somalia was no longer strategically 
important for the national security of the US. The rise of the civil war (see following 
section) saw the evacuation of numerous aid organisations such as the International 
Committee of the Red Cross, numerous NGOs and the UNHCR (UN refugee 
agency) (Bradbury, 2008:44). The peak of the economic crises was reached in 1990 
when the Central Bank ran out of money (Bradbury, 2008:46). 
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3.2.3.5 Civil War 1988 
During the late-1980s Somalia and Ethiopia signed a peace agreement. The Somali 
National Movement, which had their bases in Ethiopia, was afraid of losing their ally, 
Ethiopia, and thus their bases as well. They attacked Somali military bases in the 
north-western parts of the country. Soon other dissidents such as the Somalia 
Patriotic Movement and the United Somali Congress joined the fight against Siad 
Barre’s government, plunging the country into a protracted civil war. Eventually, in 
January 1991, Mohamed Siad Barre fled Somalia (Bradbury, 2008:46). Since Siad 
Barre’s exodus, Somalia has not had an effectively functioning central government 
that was recognised by the international community. 
3.2.4 Post-Siad Barre (1991-2010) 
The civil war in Somalia did not start with Siad Barre’s fleeing, as noted above. 
However, after he left the country, even more chaos ensued as various political and 
business elites scrambled for power and territory. Within months of his exodus, Siad 
Barre’s dictatorship was replaced by numerous warlords most of which had a similar 
dictatorial governance style. The widespread looting of public and private property, 
as well as the destruction of infrastructure, raping, killing and population evictions 
were characteristics of the period shortly after Siad Barre’s exodus (Bradbury, 
2008:47). 
Although NGOs such as the International Committee of the Red Cross recognised 
the crises and established aid programmes shortly after Siad Barre left, the UN only 
responded in 1992. The UN Security Council adopted Resolution 751 which 
authorised the establishment of the United Nations Operation in Somalia 
(UNOSOM). Operation Restore Hope, consisting of 28,000 US troops, was sent in 
by US President G.H. Bush to assist the UNOSOM mission, after UN troops were 
attacked and looted. The aim of UNOSOM was to “create a secure environment for 
the delivery of humanitarian relief” (Bradbury, 2008:48). 
In 1993 the UN Security Council adopted a further resolution which established 
UNOSOMII. UNOSOMII created a large civilian and military peace force to assist in 
the reconstruction of the political, economic and social institutions of Somalia. After 
the infamous “Black Hawk Down” incident where a number of US soldiers were 
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killed, the US withdrew its troops. Other countries soon followed and UNOSOMII 
withdrew from Somalia in 1995 without managing to achieve any form of stability 
(Bradbury, 2008:48). 
After the UNOSOM missions failed, various warring factions continued to control 
different areas of Somalia. In 2000 the Transitional National Government (TNG) was 
established by the Inter-Governmental Authority and Development (IGAD) 
organisation, a regional cooperation organisation, and was acknowledged by various 
international and regional organisations (such as the UN and the OAU). However, 
the TNG failed and was later replaced by the Transitional Federal Government 
(TFG) in 2004 (Beri, 2011:453). 
The TFG did not manage to consolidate their power and by 2006 the Islamist Union 
of Islamic Courts (UIC) managed to gain control over most parts of Somalia, except 
Somaliland. One of the main advantageous the UIC had over other warring actors 
was their ability to unite Somalis under the greater banner of Islam, while other 
warring parties operated according to clan-based identities. Fearing the rise of 
another Islamic republic, the US and Ethiopian forces managed to overthrow the UIC 
and reinstate the TFG (Beri, 2011:453). 
In 2007 the AU established the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). Since 
its inception, AMISOM has been hampered by insufficient funds for the operation. In 
2008 a splinter group of the UIC, Al-Shabaab, has gained widespread control over 
the Southern parts of Somalia. By 2010, despite electing a moderate Islamist leader 
as President (Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, previous leader of the UIC), the TFG still 
has not managed to gain widespread support among Somalis and only controlled the 
capital of Somalia, Mogadishu (Beri, 2011:453). 
It should be noted that piracy in Somalia have been present since the waning years 
of Siad Barre’s regime, but that the UNOSOM missions managed to limit piratical 
attacks due to their naval presence in the region (Weir, 2010: 17). After UNOSOM 
left, warlords managed to limit piracy by selling fishing license to foreign fishing 
vessels and ensuring their safety in Somalia’s waters (Weir, 2010: 19). During the 
short reign of the UIC, they proclaimed piracy as “Haraam” (against Islam) and acted 
proactively to end piracy by raiding known pirate ports and prosecuting known 
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pirates. With the ousting of the UIC however, piracy has flourished (Hansen, 
2009:27). 
3.3 Causes of Maritime Piracy 
Numerous factors that contribute to maritime piracy in Somalia can be identified. The 
majority of these factors are land-based political, economic or social problems. 
These factors include the country’s strategic position, the instability within Somalia, 
illegal fishing and dumping of toxic waste, economic deprivation, ineffective security, 
the social acceptability of piracy by fellow Somalis, the easy access to weapons and 
equipment and the increasing sums of ransoms pirates successfully acquire. 
3.3.1 Strategic Position 
During the Cold War, both the USSR and later the US allied themselves with 
Somalia, providing military and financial assistance, and in return gaining access to 
strategically significant ports in Somalia. Given the country’s geographical position 
on the bottle neck between the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea (which leads to the 
Suez Canal), it is still relevant today for security reasons regarding the maritime 
trade via the Suez Canal (see Map A & B). 
Various figures place the number of maritime vessels travelling through this region 
between 20-30,000 vessels annually. Considering that the furthest point between 
Yemen (the opposite coast on the Gulf of Aden) and Somalia is only 170 nautical 
miles, all ships travelling through this region could be attacked from Somalia’s shore 
(Beri, 2011:455). 
Recent piracy trends off the coast of Somalia indicate that attacks in the Indian 
Ocean is increasing. The coastline facing the Indian Ocean is more than 2,500 km in 
length, thus presenting a great area from which attacks can be launched from. Since 
Somalis are familiar with the geographical landscape, they can easily move around 
to different places along this coastline to avoid capture (Yu & Piao, 2010:85). 
3.3.2 Instability within Somalia 
The earlier analysis of the post-colonial history of Somalia highlights the political 
instability within the country. The lack of a central government for more than two 
decades has left the country in control of warlords. Currently, different areas of 
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Somalia are occupied by different warring factions and the TFG controls only parts of 
the capital, Mogadishu. Piracy is no longer committed by independent small gangs of 
outcasts. Instead, the level of planning and execution with which they operate are 
similar to those of sophisticated criminal organisations (Fouche, 2009:71). 
Numerous actors play a part in the process of maritime piracy. Some actors are 
responsible for planning the operations, others for executing the plans, financiers of 
the operation, people who conduct negotiations, actors involved in supplying arms 
and equipment and actors who collect information on possible hi-jacking vessels (Yu 
& Piao, 2010:80). Although similar criminal organisations exists in other countries as 
well (e.g. Italian and Chinese Mafias or Islamic Terrorists groups), the absence of a 
central government has made it easier for Somali groups to operate. 
One of the characteristics of Somali piracy after hi-jacking vessels is keeping them 
for ransom. They are only able to do this due to the safe sanctuaries they have on 
land (Baniela, 2010:198). In other countries where piracy is rife, such as Nigeria and 
those surrounding the Malacca Straits, some form of central governance, even weak, 
ensures that pirates do not have permanent and safe enclaves to operate from. The 
absence of a governance actor that is responsible to the international community in 
Somalia, allows for these safe and permanent enclaves. 
3.3.3 Illegal Fishing/Dumping of Toxic Waste 
Somali pirates often try to legitimise their attacks on foreign vessels in their EEZ by 
claiming that they protect their maritime resources. Contestation exists regarding this 
claim. Little doubt exists that illegal fishing and dumping of toxic chemicals took (and 
perhaps still do take) place in Somali waters. However, since Somali pirates started 
attacking various kinds of maritime vessels and not only illegal fishing vessels, the 
greed versus grievance debate regarding their motives have escalated (Baniela, 
2010:196; Beri, 2011:456; Fouche, 2009:67; Ho, 2009:502; Ikken, 2009:34; Weir, 
2010: 20; Yu & Piao, 2010:83). 
As noted earlier, during the drought of 1974-1975, Siad Barre’s government 
established numerous fishing villages. The fishing villages provided a great number 
of citizens with a sustainable living. Although many of the people returned to their 
pastoralist lifestyles after the drought, a great number remained in these fishing 
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villages. During this period, investment also ensured the creation of infrastructure for 
these villages, such as harbours (Ho, 2009:502). 
During the initial period following Siad Barre’s exodus, actors that were governing 
the South and Northern territories engaged in selling fishing licenses to foreign 
companies. Piracy developed slowly in the post-Barre era, since the warlords did not 
want anyone to undermine their lucrative business of awarding fishing licenses. 
Piracy only escalated in the Central part of Somalia where the Mugdug clan ruled. 
The herding of livestock and agriculture plays a major part in the lives of the 
inhabitants of the Northern and Southern parts of Somalia. However, the lack of any 
resources apart from fishing in the central part of Somalia made inhabitants of this 
area extremely reliable on Somalia’s marine resources. During Siad Barre’s rule, the 
Somali maritime forces protected the EEZ and in the short period (1991-1995) that 
the UN peacekeepers were stationed in Somalia, their navy protected the EEZ. But 
since the ruling Mugdug clan did not intervene in clashes between pirates and 
commercial fishing operations, the incidences of piratical attacks escalated (Weir, 
2010: 17-19). 
Many of the commercial fishing vessels that operated in the area had huge vessels 
and used technology that helped with finding the fish. In contrast to this, Somalis 
only had small vessels with no technology (Ikken, 2009:34,35). Illegal fishing 
methods, such as using dynamite, which lead to the degradation of fragile coral 
reefs, were often employed by foreign fishing vessels (Beri, 2011:456). Moreover, 
foreign vessels often dumped illegal toxic chemical waste in Somali waters that 
destroyed the marine resources and posed a health hazard for local communities 
(Ikken, 2009:34,35). Given the importance of the maritime resources to the livelihood 
of a great number of Somali citizens, it is clear that Somalis had legitimate 
grievances towards these foreign vessels. 
Initially, numerous fishermen claimed to be “coastguards”, protecting Somalia’s 
marine resources and levying taxes on those deemed to be fishing illegally. Some of 
these groups included the National Volunteer Coastguard, The Guards of Somali 
Marine Resources, the Central Regional Coastguard and the Somali Coast Guard. 
Whether these “taxes” that were enforced were distributed among the populace 
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onshore or whether these “coastguards” were merely opportunistic thieves is still 
debateable (Baniela, 2010:197). 
Although it is established that Somalis had legitimate concerns regarding the illegal 
fishing vessels in their territory, the indiscriminate attacks on all maritime vessels 
defeats their “grievance” motives for piratical attacks (Yu & Piao, 2010:83). 
Eventually, pirates not only captured and held foreign fishing vessels for ransom, but 
other commercial vessels as well. According to the IMB’s annual report on piracy 
“vessels attacked [in Somalia] included General Cargo, Bulk Carrier, all types of 
Tankers, Ro Container, Fishing Vessel, Sailing Yacht, Dhow and Tugboat, indicating 
[the] opportunistic nature of the attacks” (IMB, 2010:19). The bigger rewards that 
could be accrued by holding commercial vessels (e.g. oil tankers or cargo vessels) 
for ransom, enticed the pirates. This is a strong argument made by those who view 
the motives of Somali-pirates as predominantly greed-orientated. 
3.3.4 Economic Deprivation 
The collapse of the Central Bank at the end of Siad Barre’s rule is indicative of the 
dire economic situation the country is in. It has already been noted the extent to 
which Somalia was dependent on foreign aid for its survival, as well as how the end 
of the Cold War influenced the flow of financial aid to Somalia. Apart from Somalia’s 
rich marine resources, it has little to offer in terms of natural resources. Also, the 
decades of mismanagement, corruption, looting and conflict has prevented industries 
from developing. Other socio-economic problems related to the collapsing economy 
were the perpetual famine and unemployment problems. 
Numerous factors play a part in the perpetual famine problem of Somalia. As already 
mentioned, the 1974-1975 drought and the refugee crises of 1978-1980 had a great 
effect on the lack of food. Another of these factors was the establishment of the 
Agricultural Development Corporation under the socialist regime of Siad Barre. 
Ironically, this corporation did not foster the “development” of the agricultural sector, 
instead it had the opposite effect. This corporation prohibited the private sale of any 
agricultural products, most notably staple diets such as maize, sorghum and 
sesame. The result was that production declined. Before this practice was in place, 
Somalia was self-sufficient in grain production. However, after a couple of decades 
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of this policy, grain production dropped and Somalia had to import this commodity 
(Osman, 2007:100). 
Unemployment, together with famine, is another factor that contributed greatly to the 
rise of Somali piracy. Some estimates place the unemployment of urban Somalis at 
more than 65%. Although unemployment is not a new phenomenon in Somalia, the 
illegal fishing in Somali waters exacerbated this problem. The depletion of marine 
stocks due to the overfishing by commercial fishing vessels, lead to the decreased 
catch and thus increased unemployment for local fisherman. Fishing villages, 
together with people from other desperate areas, proved to be fertile grounds for 
recruiting pirates (Beri, 2011:456). 
3.3.5 Ineffective Security 
The lack of security around the coasts of Somalia has ensured that piracy is a low-
risk, high-reward activity. The vastness of the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden, 
together with the limited number of security forces to patrol the area has decreased 
the likelihood of the pirates getting caught. In contrast to this, the high ransom pay-
outs received after the successful hi-jacking of a vessels, as well as successful 
negotiations for its release, has encouraged other would-be pirates to engage in 
piratical activities. 
The difficulties in prosecuting pirates once they are caught, has decreased the risk to 
pirates. Numerous incidents have been recorded where pirates have been caught by 
foreign navies either in Somali waters or on the High Seas, but no countries were 
willing to bring charges against them. In once such incident in May 2010, the US 
navy apprehended 10 pirates while they were trying to hijack an Indian cargo ship. 
After being held captive for six weeks, they US navy set the pirates free, since no 
country was willing to prosecute them (Pham, 2010:332). 
I.M. Lewis (2008:55) notes that “in this uncertain [pastoral] environment a man’s 
riches may disappear almost overnight in the wake of some natural calamity. Thus 
the Somali nomad is by temperament and practice a gambler who appreciates the 
transitory nature of success and failure.” This gives us great insight into the 
character of Somali people. And given Somalis’ tendency to “gamble” it is not 
surprising that they partake in this low-risk, high-reward activity. 
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3.3.6 Social Acceptability 
The grievance orientated motive for engaging in piratical attacks has often been 
rejected due to the indiscriminate nature of hijackings. However, it is important to 
note that the Somali people might not share these sentiments. Whether outside 
actors believes the threat of illegal fishing is real or only perceived is irrelevant. To 
the local populace, the threat of the depletion of their marine resources is real and 
thus the acts of piracy are legitimised in the eyes of the local populace (Yu & Piao, 
2010:84). And in the absence of a governing state that would normally resist piratical 
behaviour, the pirates have the support instead of resistance of the Somalis. 
Although some Somalis complain about the insecurity they feel due to the weapons 
pirates carry with them, or their excessive consumption of alcohol and khat (a natural 
stimulant that is chewed), many residents benefit from the influx of capital. It is often 
the case that pirates pay Qaaraan to the local people, a sort of social welfare, 
gaining their favour (Hansen, 2009:26). Furthermore, the great influx of capital has 
created jobs and economic opportunities that did not previously exist. Many towns 
that are infamous for their pirate activity within the international community (such as 
Kismayo, Mogadishu and Eyl, see Map C) are famous in Somalia due to the 
booming nature of their economies (Ho, 2009:503).  
Initially, after Siad Barre took power, his new regime was welcomed by the Somalis. 
The regime’s sentiments regarding anti-imperialism and pro-Islam were shared by 
the Somalis who had extensive experience of foreign involvement in their sovereign 
affaires. Recent involvement of foreign navies in Somalia’s EEZ and attacks by US 
forces on Somali soil against suspected Islamic terrorists has increased (Pham, 
2010:331; Swart, 2009:55). Such actions could lead to renewed sentiments of anti-
interference by external forces among Somalis. Moreover, such sentiments could 
fuel the support by locals of pirates who “protect” their territory. 
3.3.7 Access to Weapons/Equipment 
Almost since independence Somalia has been flooded with weapons. During the 
democratic era, the government armed for the pan-Somali struggle, and later Siad 
Barre did the same. During the Cold War the USSR and the US supplied military aid 
to Somalia at various times during their alliances. In the post-Siad Barre era the 
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weapons accrued by the Siad Barre regime became spoils for the contesting groups. 
Groups who were well represented in the security forces benefitted the most from 
the military hardware (Osman, 2007:105). Additionally, during the protracted civil 
war, militias had the opportunity to establish illicit weapon trading structures that still 
endures (Yu & Piao, 2010:85). In 1992 the UN imposed an arms embargo on 
Somalia, but the illicit trade structures had by then been well established and arms 
continued to flood in. The main source of weapons in Somalia is from Yemen (Beri, 
2011:461). 
Therefore, the level of weapons proliferation in Somalia is great and pirates could 
easily gain access to weapons. And the kind of weapons they most commonly use, 
AK-47s and Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs), is indicative of the sort of weapons 
that were widely used during the Cold War era. 
The vessels Somali pirates use most often includes high speed skiffs and 
motherships. Traditionally, fishermen used these small skiffs, together with 
motherships. The motherships allowed fisherman to stay at sea for longer periods of 
time and allowed for more fuel, food and a place to fix their fishing nets. Modern 
Somali pirates use similar methods and often it is difficult for patrol ships or 
commercial vessels to distinguish between fisherman and pirates. Only after patrol 
ships board the “suspicious” vessel could they learn the true motives behind the 
occupants. While fisherman’s vessels would carry the tools of their trade, pirate 
vessels would typically include ladders, weapons and sophisticated navigation 
equipment (Weir, 2010: 20). 
As noted earlier, piracy in Somalia no longer consists of small bandits. Instead they 
much closer represent organised crime groups. For pirates to gain access to 
sophisticated navigation equipment such as Global Positioning Systems (GPSs) and 
mobile or satellite phones via these networks would not be a problem. Also, part of 
this network is the informers at various ports in the region that provide information to 
the pirates on the activities of vessels in return for a cut of the ransom (Beri, 
2011:454). 
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3.3.8 Ransom 
Most ship owners, faced with the loss of their seafarers, vessels and its cargo, gives 
in to the ransom demands of pirates. Although the response by ship owners is 
logical, it sets a dangerous precedent. The more successful piratical attacks become 
due to increasing ransom pay-outs, the more people engage in this activity, creating 
a snowball effect. Therefore, the increasing pay-outs might lead to more piracy, 
which in turn increases the danger to other seafarers and vessels navigating through 
the region.  
This is evident when one observes the rapid increase in piracy during 2008. In the 
first quarter of 2008, only 11 attacks were recorded in Somalia and the Gulf of Aden. 
This number rose to 28 in the second quarter, 50 in the third quarter and 51 in the 
last quarter (Yu & Piao, 2010:79). The ransom demands also increased from a 
couple of thousand dollars to millions of dollars. Most companies, as well as pirates 
tend to keep ransom negotiations quiet, but a record deal was reached in 2010 
between Somali pirates and the owners of a Greek supertanker for US$9 million 
(Beri, 2011:455). 
3.4 Modus Operandi 
Focusing on the direct manifestations of piratical behaviour in Somalia can be useful 
when developing anti-piracy measures. From the analysis above is it clear that the 
symptoms leading to piracy did not develop overnight, neither will the solution be. 
But given the great threat Somali-piracy poses to maritime security and international 
trade it is necessary to investigate these direct manifestations and develop more 
efficient and viable short-term countermeasures. 
Thus far, the use of skiffs and motherships has been identified, as well as the use of 
sophisticated navigational and communications equipment. Recently, a more 
worrying trend has developed where pirates hijack commercial vessels and use them 
as motherships. Traditionally, the motherships that were used were similar to those 
used by fisherman. However, an additional surprise factor could be added to attacks 
from commercial vessels that act as motherships, since they will be less suspicious 
(IMB, 2010:19). Another tactic pirates have used to lure in unsuspecting targets is by 
fainting distress calls. Other seafarers, unaware of the motives of the pirates, gets 
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lured in and then attacked (Yu & Piao, 2010:85). Also, reports have shown that 
pirates sometimes conduct dummy attacks in an attempt to divert warships’ attention 
from real attacks (Baniela, 2010:194). 
Somali pirates are more likely to carry out attacks on vessels when it is not the 
monsoon season. The strong winds and rough seas are difficult to navigate with 
small skiffs. Somalia has two monsoon seasons, one running from December until 
March and another one running from June until September (Hansen, 2009:22). 
Furthermore, the time of day pirates are most likely to attack are between 2200 and 
0600 hours. During these times it is more difficult to spot pirates, making it easier for 
them to operate and more difficult for self-defensive actions from vessels or 
deterrence from warships (Baniela, 2010:194). 
The use of AK47s and RPGs is well known. However, little attention has been given 
regarding the level of violence the pirates employ during a hijacking or during 
ransom negotiations. According to IMB statistics, a total of 219 piratical incidents 
took place in the areas surrounding Somalia (including the Gulf of Aden and the 
Indian Ocean) during January and December 2010. Of these attacks, 1016 seafarers 
were taken hostage, 13 were injured and 8 killed (IMB, 2010:19). Killing hostages 
are less likely to occur during Somali hijackings since that would affect ransom 
negotiations negatively (Baniela, 2010:195). The loss of lives is always unfortunate 
for those involved. But the loss of life is relatively low when one considers the 
number of attacks that took place. Also, in comparison to other conflict areas, the 
loss of lives is considerably less. 
As already mentioned, pirates are no longer small gangs operating independently. 
The vast network of pirate organisations includes numerous actors. However, those 
actors who are involved in the actual piratical attacks can be divided into three 
groups. First are the local fishermen whose knowledge of the terrain and seafaring 
capabilities are useful. Secondly are the ex-militiamen who can be viewed as “the 
muscle” behind the attacks. Their knowledge of firearms and tactics are useful during 
attacks. The last group which can be identified are those who are responsible for 
operating the high-tech navigation and communication equipment used (Ho, 
2009:504). This “job specification” leads to teams which are more capable and more 
effective. 
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Currently, there are four active pirate groups (or organisations) operating from 
Somalia. These include the National Volunteer Coast Guard (operating around 
Kismayo), the Marka Group (operating around Mogadishu), the Puntland Group 
(operating from Puntland) and the Somali Marines (operating around Central 
Somalia) (Swart, 2009:53). However, little is known about these pirates’ 
organisations. More knowledge of figureheads and the organisational structure of 
these organisations would allow more effective combating against these 
organisations (e.g. placing targeted sanctions against several key leaders). 
Contrary to most other piracy prone areas, hijacking ships and keeping them for 
ransom occurs often in Somalia. Two main reasons for this trend can be identified. 
Firstly, the lack of central government in Somalia (and thus security forces) allows 
pirates to operate from enclaves. After hijacking ships, they can safely dock them in 
these areas without fear of prosecution while they engage in ransom negotiations 
(Baniela, 2010:194). Furthermore, as noted earlier, pirates receive little resistance 
from the local populations due to their benevolent behaviour. 
The second reason why Somali pirates prefer keeping ships for ransom rather than 
robbing them is due to the lack of infrastructure. In other areas where piracy is 
rampant (such as the Malacca Straits and Nigeria), some form of government is still 
present, maintaining the infrastructure. Moving massive amounts of goods or oil 
requires harbour infrastructure to unload the stolen commodities as well as road 
networks to transport them (Pham, 2010:333). 
Apart from maritime security, another major concern regarding Somali piracy is the 
connection between piracy and maritime terrorism. However, the major difference 
between piracy and terrorism is the different motives of the actors involved. It has 
been noted that greed (as appose to grievance) have lately been the main 
motivations of Somali pirates, which is evident by the various ships hijacked and held 
for ransom. In contrast to this, jihadist terrorism aims to inflict damage upon the West 
by disrupting the world economic order (Swart, 2009:49). Therefore, one can argue 
that the modus operandi of these differing actors would not be the same. Instead of 
hijacking vessels, jihadist terrorist groups’ attacks would rather reflect that of suicide 
bombings. This was the case in one attempted and one successful attacks against 
US warships docked in Yemeni ports during 2000. In both suicide missions, 
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speedboats laden with explosives were used. While the attack against the USS 
Sullivans failed due to the speedboat sinking, the attack against the USS Cole left 17 
sailors dead (Luft & Korin, 2004:64). A similar incident occurred in 2002 when a 
French Oil tanker, the MV Limburg was bombed (Swart, 2009:45). 
However, a counter argument for the involvement of radical Islamic terrorism can be 
made. The possibility that jihadist movements participate in piratical activities off the 
coast of Somalia in order to finance their terrorist activities cannot be denied. Waging 
a physical war against “infidels” is only one part of the holy war. Al-Jihad bi-al-Mal, 
also known as Financial Jihad, concerns the raising of funds to support jihad soldiers 
(Swart, 2009:62). However, despite some plausible arguments made that identifies 
links between Somali pirates and jihad terrorism; no substantial links have been 
found (Anyu & Moki, 2009:116). 
Recent trends of maritime piracy in Somalia also suggest that piracy is spreading 
out. Initially, most attacks occurred along the narrow corridor of the Gulf of Aden. 
However, the extensive use of motherships has allowed the pirates to attack further 
out in the Indian Ocean. One case that illustrates the reach of pirates was the 
hijacking of the MV Winfar 161, a Taiwanese fishing vessel, close to the EEZ of the 
Seychelles (Swart, 2009:49). This is also evident from the statistics in the IMB’s 
annual piracy report. During 2009 117 attacks were carried out in the Gulf of Aden, 
while only 80 were carried out in Somali waters. In 2010 these figures changed 
dramatically. While only 53 attacks took place in the Gulf of Aden, the figure for 
Somalia was almost three times that with 139 attacks (IMB, 2010:5).  
This shift in attacks of the pirates is largely attributed to the extensive naval presence 
in the Gulf of Aden. With the increasing naval presence in the Gulf of Aden, 
successful attacks in Aden has decreased from one in three to one in four vessels 
successfully attacked (Ho, 2009:511). During 2010, almost 50 warships from various 
nations under different operations were present in the region (Baniela, 2010:201). 
The extent of the naval presence will be discussed in more detail in the following 
section. 
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3.5 Contemporary Anti-Piracy Efforts 
Altogether, almost 50 warships provide security in the Gulf of Aden and the areas 
surrounding Somalia. The three major operations currently are the Combined Task 
Force-151, 2009 (US), Operation Ocean Shield, 2009 (NATO) and Operation 
ATLANTA, 2008 (EU). Operating alongside them are various warships from 
countries that are not aligned with any of these institutions, such as Russia, China, 
India, Japan, Singapore and Pakistan among others (Beri, 2011:457).  
Amid the rapid rise of piracy during 2008, the UN Security Council adopted a 
resolution (1846) that allowed foreign navies to enter Somalia’s EEZ to conduct anti-
piracy missions. The TFG consented to this, since they do not have the ability or the 
resources to ensure the safety of their own territorial waters (Ho, 2009:508). 
One of the main criticisms against these anti-piracy issues is that they engage with 
the problem only in the maritime sphere, while they essentially ignore the land-based 
origins of the problem (Baniela, 2010:199). One of the few operations that engage 
with the land-based issues is AMISOM, established in 2007, which has been 
ineffective mainly due to a lack of resources (Beri, 2011:461). The lack of other land-
based initiatives could be ascribed to the previous failures of the UN’s UNOSOM I 
and UNOSOM II, along with the US’s Operation Restore Hope (Beri, 2011:453). 
Therefore, these forces seem to be addressing only the short-term problem and not 
the root causes of piracy in Somalia. 
Other critics note that the warships seem to ignore the only legitimate motivation for 
piracy Somalis pose - that of illegal fishing and dumping (Ikken, 2009:34). Also, as 
noted earlier, these forces focus mostly on maritime traffic in the Gulf of Aden, 
leading to the spread of piracy throughout the Indian Ocean. 
Regionally, numerous conferences has been organised in order to formulate policies 
regarding maritime piracy in Somalia. In 2008 the Arab League held meetings in 
Egypt with several countries (including Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Sudan, Jordan, 
Djibouti and Somalia’s TFG) in the region to coordinate their anti-piracy strategies. A 
similar conference was held later that year in Nairobi, Kenya. This conference was 
supported by the UN and included delegates from 45 countries. In 2009, numerous 
governments adopted the Djibouti Code of Conduct Concerning the Repression of 
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Piracy and Armed Robbery in the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden, after a 
conference organised by the IMO (Ho, 2009:509). 
Most commercial vessels navigating through the region employ self-protection, 
rather than anti-piracy measures. These measures include non-lethal deterrents 
(such as water cannons and electric fencing) and more sophisticated technologies 
(such satellite tracking devices and the Long Range Acoustic Device) (Baniela, 
2010:201). Other vessels mitigate the risks involved by navigating around the Cape 
of Good Hope. Although this option is more time-consuming and less fuel efficient 
making it more costly, shipping companies save on insurance costs and danger pay 
to seafarers (Ho, 2009:505). 
3.6 Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter was to give a brief overview of the political, economic 
and social issues that shaped modern Somalia, as well as the direct causes of 
maritime piracy in Somalia. 
Although the historical developments in Somalia did not have a direct effect on 
modern day piracy, it did create favourable conditions for piracy to flourish.  One of 
the historic factors that played a role in maritime piracy was the political, economic 
and social instability that was created during colonisation. The platform from which 
the post-independent governments had to operate was unstable and the democratic 
form of governance was soon after independence replaced by an autocratic leader. 
Despite initial popularity, Mohammed Siad Barre’s suppressing regime became 
increasingly unpopular. Furthermore, harsh environmental conditions such as the 
1974-1975 drought, the refugee crises and the civil war plunged the country into 
deeper instability. 
The direct causes of maritime piracy in Somalia have also been identified. These 
included the country’s strategic position, the current instability within the country, 
illegal fishing and dumping by foreign vessels and on-going economic deprivation, as 
well as the lack of effective security in the maritime and domestic domains. 
Furthermore, the social acceptability of piratical activities have allowed pirates to 
engage in such activities unhindered from local populations while easily being able to 
access weapons and equipment have allowed them to engage in piratical activities. 
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Lastly, the increasing amounts and increasing number of ransom pay-outs have 
created a snowball effect which led to more people engaging in piratical activities. 
In accordance with the secondary objectives set out in this study, this chapter 
focussed on the modus operandi of pirates, as well as current initiatives to counter 
piracy. From this chapter it became evident that pirates employ the same tactics for 
piratical activities that fishermen use. Also, pirates in Somalia are no longer small 
groups of bandits. Instead, they are highly organised criminal groups. And despite 
the huge international naval presence in the areas surrounding Somalia, limited 
success has been achieved. 
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CHAPTER 4 – Case Study: Nigeria 
4.1 Introduction 
Nigeria, officially known as the Federal Republic of Nigeria, is situated in West 
Africa. Nigeria shares a border with Cameroon and Chad to the east, Niger to the 
north and Benin to the West (see Map E). The southern part of Nigeria is comprised 
of a coastline spanning 853 kilometres, situated in the Gulf of Guinea. The state is 
comprised of 36 federal states with a total population of 138 million people, the most 
populous in Africa. The capital of Nigeria is Abuja and the most populous city is 
Lagos. 
Nigeria has an extensive history of contact with Europeans. Since the 15th century 
Portuguese (and later Dutch and British) merchants were trading with the inhabitants 
of areas that fall within the modern borders of Nigeria. During the “Scramble for 
Africa” and the period following it, different parts of West Africa were unified under 
British occupation and a unified colony was established. Nigeria gained 
independence from Britain in 1960. The post-independence period has largely been 
characterised by military rule, with only brief stints of civilian rule. 
The long history of the involvement with European powers is attributed to the slave 
trade industry on the west coast of Africa. Later, trade in agricultural products 
became more prominent. Although Nigeria is rich in mineral resources (natural gas, 
gold and coal among others), the greatest source of revenue for the state is through 
the extraction of petroleum resources. Most of the petroleum resources are 
concentrated in the Niger Delta, a conflict prone area in the South East of the 
country. 
Like most other African countries, borders drawn by colonial powers did not take into 
account the various ethnic groups of the local inhabitants. Thus, like most other 
African countries, Nigeria does not represent a homogenous population. The main 
ethnic groups are the Hausa and Fulani (about 30% of the population, inhabits the 
northern parts of Nigeria), Yoruba (in the south west, 17%) and the Igbo (inhabiting 
the eastern parts of Nigeria, 33%) and numerous other minority clans. Furthermore, 
the country is also roughly divided in half by the Muslim-dominated north and the 
Christian-dominated south. 
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Although piracy in Nigeria has not reached the same levels as in Somalia, it has 
become a major threat to maritime security. The areas surrounding the Niger Delta 
and Lagos are the most prone to piratical attacks. This study will mainly focus on 
piracy in the Niger Delta. Most of the attacks in the Niger Delta can be attributed to 
the conflict in the area (see Map F).  
Following this brief introduction will be a more detailed discussion on the modern 
history of Nigeria and the Niger Delta. The second section of this chapter will deal 
with the factors attributing to maritime piracy in the Niger Delta. This section will be 
followed by a discussion on the direct manifestations of piracy in Nigeria. Finally, an 
analysis and evaluation will be done of current counter-piracy activities in the area. 
4.2 Background 
4.2.1 European Involvement 
Initial European involvement along the west coast of Africa was primarily concerned 
with the slave trade industry. During the 15th and 19th century, an estimated 3.5 
million Nigerians became victims of the slave trade. During the 15th century, Portugal 
was the dominant European power involved in Nigeria. Later, during the 17th century, 
the French and the British became more involved. Eventually, in 1807, the British 
banned the trade in slaves largely due to the pressures of Christian and business 
groups (Gordon, 2003). 
Another significant development came after 1850 when quinine was discovered. 
Before quinine was discovered European expansion inland was limited. Quinine 
provided the first effective treatment for malaria. Upward expansion along the Niger 
River increased rapidly as more trading posts and missionaries were established. 
During this time, the palm oil trade became so valuable to the British that they 
established a consulate in the Niger Delta region (Gordon, 2003). Later, in 1891, the 
areas surrounding the Niger River formally became a protectorate of Britain 
(Crowder, 1978:161). 
Although Lagos has long been involved in trade with the European powers, it was 
only colonised in 1861 by the British. This was done by the British in order to 
establish their dominance in the palm oil industry. Later, after the northern parts of 
Nigeria were colonised, Lagos would become the capital (Gordon, 2003). 
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In 1886, a Royal Charter was granted to the Royal Niger Company to administer the 
areas in Nigeria. The Royal Niger Company established a headquarters, as well as a 
constabulary, courts and the necessary administrative institutions to manage the 
area. They also expanded their territory inland by signing treaties with the local 
groups (Burns, 1972:158-168). In 1899 the British government revoked the Charter, 
largely due to complaints of unfair trading practices by the Royal Niger Company. 
Also, the threat of other European powers necessitated more direct involvement by 
the British government (Crowder, 1978:171). 
During 1900 and 1903 Frederick Lugard, the High Commissioner, managed to 
consolidate British power over the northern territories of Nigeria. He achieved this 
goal via treaties with local leaders. These diplomatic measures between the British 
administration and the local leaders would later become known as indirect rule and 
would be used effectively across northern Nigeria. When diplomatic measures failed, 
Lugard merely coerced groups into submission (Library of Congress, 2008:3). The 
northern and southern territories of Nigeria were eventually unified to form the new 
nation of Nigeria in 1914 (Crowder, 1978:191). 
4.2.2 Colonisation 
Economic viability was the main motive of the unification of the northern and 
southern protectorates. The northern region placed increased strain on the British 
government and taxpayers because it was not economically viable. The north did not 
have access to maritime trading routes because it had no access to the oceans. 
Furthermore, the lack of transport infrastructure ensured that trade was limited in the 
north. Contrary to this, the southern region was prosperous. By amalgamating the 
two territories the excess monies of the south could be redirected to sustaining the 
north (Crowder, 1978:196). It should be noted that the southern part of Nigeria 
comprised two different administrative regions (commonly referred to as the eastern 
and western regions).  
Despite the merger of some government departments, such as the treasury, the 
railways and the post and telegraph departments, not much political integration took 
place. While the southern parts were governed more directly, the north was still 
governed according to the ideology of indirect rule (Falola, 1999:69). Colonial rulers 
left the governance of groups up to their traditional leaders and their respective 
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governance methods, as long as they accepted British authority, cooperated with 
British officials and did not engage in slave trade (Library of Congress, 2008:3). 
Under the administrative methods the colonial rulers applied in the north, indirect 
rule, traditional rulers were more powerful. Since these rulers were employed by the 
colony and responsible only to the colony (as appose to their people), traditional 
checks and balances faded away. Local kings and chiefs tended to abuse their 
powers for self-gain (Falola, 1999:72). Furthermore, the leaders exempted family 
members and friends from taxes, creating a system of patronage. The rest of the 
local populations however, had little avenue for complaints against their leaders 
(Gordon, 2003). Corruption in all its various forms (bribery, theft, extortion, nepotism 
and patronage) is still a major characteristic of contemporary Nigeria. 
In order to avoid competition for British firms, industrialisation needed to be avoided 
in British colonies. Economic activities in colonies often merely involved extracting 
natural resources and transporting it to Britain while also serving as markets for 
finalised goods. This was also the case in Nigeria. The only industry that was 
developed to some extent was the agricultural industry, of which the surpluses were 
exported (Falola, 1999:74). The underdevelopment of Nigerian industries was 
prevalent in the post-independence era. 
4.2.3 Nigerian Nationalism 
During the 1930s the economic depression that started in the United States spread 
throughout the world. The increasing pressure on the financial situation of Nigerians 
and their increasing disillusionment of the colonial authorities led to the creation of 
organisations which represented the local populace and their issues. 
One of the early movements that rejected the inherent racism of the colonial 
education structure was the Nigerian Youth Movement, formed in 1936. Students of 
the Yaba College, which were merely educated to become civil servants, wanted the 
curriculum to include numerous professions. Although their initial concerns regarded 
education, this mandate later expanded to include broader issues such as anti-
imperialism, economic exploitation and social inequality (Gordon, 2003). 
During WW2 about a 100 000 Nigerians were recruited to serve in the British forces. 
Throughout the war they were exposed to Allied propaganda regarding freedom, 
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liberty and equality. These principles were also expressed in the Atlantic Charter of 
the newly formed United Nations. Upon return the Nigerian soldiers propagated 
these views to fellow Nigerians, which exposed the double standards of their colonial 
power (Gordon, 2003). Unlike in most other African countries, the transfer of power 
in Nigeria between the colonial power and its colonies was peaceful. Between 1945 
and 1960 numerous constitutional changes led to the independence of Nigeria. 
4.2.4 Independence (1960) 
Upon independence in 1960, Nigeria had numerous political, economic and social 
issues that needed to be addressed. These issues were largely as a result of the 
administrative policies employed by the colonial administration. The main problems 
included the disparities created between the northern and southern (collectively the 
eastern and western region) territories, the underdevelopment of the economy and 
the legacy of corruption. Throughout the next section, it will become evident that 
these issues can be directly linked to the failures of the post-independence 
governments, civilian and military, as well as to the factors that led to the rise of 
piracy in Nigeria. One of the colonial legacies that did not last in the post-
independence era was the Nigerian nationalism. 
4.2.4.1 First Republic (1960-1966) 
At the time of independence, foreign companies were still the dominant force in the 
economy. Therefore, many actors wanted to gain political power in order to gain 
access to public funds for self-enrichment (Gordon, 2003). For the duration of the 
first republic a fierce political rivalry existed between the northern parts of the country 
(the dominating political force) and the southern parts (which dominated the 
economic sphere). In their quest to gain power, politicians often evoked ethnic, 
religious and regional identities in order to gain public support. During this period 
methods of bribery, theft, extortion, nepotism and patronage were employed by 
politicians to increase their sphere of influence. This increased the divisions among 
Nigerians, as well as delegitimised the government (Falola, 1999:102). 
The first democratic election of the post-independence period was held in 1964. In 
the run up to the elections, unsurprisingly (given the north-south divide), two 
coalitions emerged. While the Nigerian National Alliance (NNA) represented the 
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majority of northerners, the United Progressive Grand Alliance represented the 
southerners (Falola, 1999:105). Although the NNA won the elections, the election 
process was marred by fraud and political violence was widespread. Similar 
conditions and practices were present in the 1965 regional elections (Gordon, 2003). 
In January 1966, the military successfully executed a coup, which was followed by a 
counter-coup in July of the same year when Lieutenant-colonel Yakubu Gowon 
became the new head of state (Falola, 1999:119). 
4.2.4.2 Military Rule (1966-1979) 
The initial period after the First Republic was dominated by the Nigerian civil war. In 
1967 the eastern part of Nigeria unilaterally declared their independence. 
Immediately after this, Gowon declared a state of emergency and assumed full 
power over the government. The main cause of the conflict had its origin in the 
fragmented nature of the Nigerian society, the unequal distribution of political and 
economic power, corruption and oil. 
It should be noted that the extraction of oil began in all earnest during the first period 
of military rule. Most of the oil was situated in the eastern parts of Nigeria, around the 
Niger Delta. At independence, Nigeria only produced 17000 barrels of oil a day. A 
decade later, this figure increased to more than a million barrels a day (Falola, 
1999:132). Access to these resources would dominate the political agenda of most 
actors in the following decades. 
Since the eastern parts of Nigeria consisted merely of federal states, the greatest 
proportion of revenue generated by the oil extraction in this region was transferred to 
the central government. The inhabitants of eastern Nigeria resented this practice, 
while the northerners supported this system. This allowed them access to the 
windfalls that often accompanies the discovery of oil (Falola, 1999:126). 
The conflict endured for almost 3 years, in which time an estimated one million 
Nigerians lost their lives. The conflict ended in 1970 after Gowon’s forces defeated 
the dissidents in the eastern territories (Falola, 1999:123). 
During the 1970s Nigeria entered a period of relative political stability, largely due to 
the increasing revenues accumulated during the 1973/1974 oil crises. Nigeria, who 
had joined the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), joined other 
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oil producers in manipulating the oil markets by regulating the exports of oil. While 
the state enjoyed generous profits from the oil industry, excessive spending ensued. 
However, the drop in demand of oil during the late 1970s again brought about 
instability. The Gowon regime was also accused of being excessively corrupt and 
allowing inflation to go unchecked, which led to declining living standards for the 
majority of people (Falola, 1999:138). Eventually, Lieutenant-General Murtala 
Mohammed took power in a bloodless coup in 1975 (Library of Congress, 2008:5). 
In 1976 Mohammed was assassinated in a failed coup attempt, upon which 
Lieutenant-General Olusegun Obasanjo succeeded Mohammed. Before his death, 
however, Mohammed implemented wide ranging programs to address corruption, to 
overhaul the civil service, as well as a four year program for the transition from 
military rule back to civilian rule. Obasanjo carried out these initiatives and in 1979 
Nigeria again held democratic elections (Library of Congress, 2008:5; Falola, 
1999:152,154,161). 
 4.2.4.3 Second Republic (1979-1983) 
The parties and politicians that contested in the 1979 election were very similar to 
those that ruled during the First Republic. The presence of the military ensured that 
the elections were devoid of political intimidation and fraud. The only controversy 
surrounding the 1979 election regarded the presidential elections. The presidential 
candidate, Alhaji Shehu Shagari did not fulfil the criteria of becoming president, but 
the issue was cleared up by the Judiciary and Shagari was declared the winner 
(Gordon, 2003).  
Since the political parties and politicians closely represented that of the First 
Republic, similar issues led to its downfall. The major difference between the two 
republics was the windfalls brought about by the petroleum extraction industry. Not 
only did conflict between the oil producing and nonoil producing states increase, 
corruption spread to virtually every section of society as politicians increased their 
patronage networks (Gordon, 2003). 
Once again, the 1983 elections were plagued by fraud and political intimidation was 
widespread as more actors vied more actively for the spoils that government 
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positions bring. On New Year’s Eve 1983, Major General Muhammadu Buhari seized 
power in a military coup (Library of Congress, 2008:5). 
4.2.4.4 Military Rule (1983-1998) 
The last period of military rule, before Nigeria returned to civilian rule in 1998, was 
characterised by stricter authoritarianism, more corruption, more violence and less 
accountability. Three military rulers dominated this era, Major General Buhari (1983-
1985), Major General Ibrahim Babangida (1985-1992) and General Sani Abacha 
(1993-1998) (Falola, 1999:179; Library of Congress, 2008:6). During their regimes, it 
became evident that Nigeria had become a rentier state. 
Rentier states are often classified as those states who relies almost exclusively on 
profits from external financial sources (as opposed to taxes) to finance their regimes 
and the state. Accountability towards citizens in rentier states is often low, since 
governments feel they have no responsibility towards citizens because they are not 
reliant on their financial support (taxes) to uphold the state and the government. The 
development of other sectors of the economy is often low, due to the easy access to 
funds from the external source (Falola, 1999:143). This was the case in Nigeria 
where oil acted as the external financial resource. 
Throughout his regime, Buhari gathered little public support and Major General 
Babangida used this to his advantage to oust Buhari in 1985. Babangida proved 
equally unpopular largely due to the weakening economic situation of both working 
and middleclass Nigerians. The rising national debt led to the implementation of 
Structural Adjustment Programs (SAP) which had a devastating effect on the 
Nigerian Economy (Library of Congress, 2008:6). 
One of the consequences of the implementation of the SAPs was the devaluation of 
the Nigerian currency, the Naira. As the currency weakened, imports became 
increasingly expensive. Due to the rentier nature of the Nigerian state, local 
industries never developed and the vast majority of commodities were imported. The 
problem was so severe that even the middleclass experienced financial woes 
(Falola, 1999:185). 
Babangida implemented political reforms to allow a return to civilian rule, but 
throughout the process he acted as a spoiler, due to his unwillingness to relent his 
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power. However, fearing the possibility of a coup, he installed an Interim National 
Government and vacated his office in 1993 (Falola, 1999:193). 
Of all the military rulers General Sani Abacha, who took office in 1993, is seen as the 
most corrupt and most despotic. He also half-heartedly implemented democratic 
reforms due to mounting international and domestic pressures. After his sudden 
death in 1998, his chief of defence, Major General Abdulsalami Abubakar assumed 
control and oversaw the change to civilian rule (Library of Congress, 2008:6). 
4.2.4.5 Third Republic (1999-Present) 
In 1999 the previous military ruler, Olusegun Obasanjo, was elected as president. 
The election process was flawed and the former US president, Jimmy Carter, who 
monitored the election, refused to endorse the results (Gordon, 2003). 
One of the major problems that faced the Obasanjo regime was the ethnic strife in 
the eastern states, where insurgents launched attacks against foreign oil companies 
and their workers. Obasanjo was re-elected in 2003 but his reign ended in 2007 
when his mandated term as president ended. Umaru Musa Yar’Adua won the 2007 
presidential elections (Library of Congress, 2008:7). Vice-President Goodluck 
Jonathan succeeded Yar’Adua early in 2010, after he fell ill. After Yar’Adua passed 
away, Goodluck Jonathan was inaugurated as the 14th president of Nigeria (BBC, 
2011). 
It is important to note that piracy was largely contained during the military regimes, 
mainly by the use of force. In the Third Republic however, piracy had greatly 
increased. This can be attributed to various factors, which will be discussed in a 
following section.  
4.2.5 Niger Delta 
The area known as the Niger Delta is situated in the south-eastern part of Nigeria 
and constitutes nine of the 36 states in Nigeria. About 30 million people inhabit this 
region. The vast riches of petroleum resources in the Niger Delta are in stark 
contrast to the heightened levels of poverty and underdevelopment of the area. The 
extraction of petroleum resources contributes almost 80% of government revenues, 
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yet a fraction of this is reinvested in the area while extensive environmental damage 
threatens the lifestyles of the Niger Delta inhabitants (Ikelgebe, 2005:208). 
Political, economic, social and environmental grievances led to the rise of militias in 
the Niger Delta. Most militias operating in the Niger Delta claim to be fighting these 
injustices of the Niger Delta people. It is important to note the difficulty of 
differentiating between militias and pirates. Ibaba and Ikelegbe (2010:10) notes that 
“there is a strong linkage between militias, armed gangs and cultists, the pirates and 
the bunkerers (the illegal siphoning of fuel). The boundaries between them may be 
fluid as one group could easily merge into the other.” Ibaba and Ikelegbe (2010:10) 
continues: “to separate pirates from militias would be like separating Siamese twins 
rather than separating sheep from goats.” According to Vreÿ (2009:24) “aggressors 
like MEND use a deliberate campaign at sea to influence decisions about landward 
matters, and the oil industry with its maritime footprint offers lucrative opportunities.” 
It is thus safe to conclude that piracy is often a “tool” used by militias to further their 
political or personal agendas. Thus, in order to adequately address the factors 
attributing to maritime piracy in the Niger Delta, a holistic historical view of the 
conflict in the Niger Delta is necessary. 
4.2.5.1 Resistance Pre- and Post-Independence 
As already noted, oil was discovered in the Niger Delta in 1956 and extraction began 
in 1958. Initially, conflict in the Niger Delta centred on the marginalisation of the 
minority groups in the Niger Delta. Later, after the extraction of oil began, control 
over the revenues generated from the oil industry dominated the conflict. Due to the 
political division created during the colonial era, the politically dominating northern 
regions had the power to allocate funds from the oil extraction industry resulting in 
great flows of capital towards the northern areas of Nigeria, neglecting the 
development of the Niger Delta. During the First Republic, protests in the Niger Delta 
were largely peaceful. This changed after the military coup by Lieutenant-colonel 
Yakubu Gowon in 1966. 
In 1966 the Niger Delta Volunteer Service (NDVS) emerged under the leadership of 
Adaka Boro. The NDVS was a secession movement and unilaterally declared the 
Niger Delta independent. Gowon reacted to this by declaring a state of emergency 
and launching a war against the Niger Delta dissidents, embroiling the country in a 
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civil war. The war ended almost three years later after Gowon’s forces defeated the 
NDVS (Ibaba & Ikelgebe, 2010:6). 
In subsequent years political dissidents were successfully oppressed by military rule. 
During the 1970s oil-boom, the communities in the Niger Delta redirected their 
grievances towards Multinational Oil Companies (MNOC) operating in the region that 
were profiting heavily from the oil-crises. They demanded adequate infrastructure as 
well as remuneration for the environmental damage caused by the industry. Protests 
however, were largely non-violent and manifested in ways such as blocking access 
to roads and occupying oil facilities (Bischoff, 2010:42). 
Violent protests in the Niger Delta only emerged during the early 1990s. The 
increased oppression by military forces was met with increasing violent action 
against the state and MNOCs by Niger Delta inhabitants. In 1995 the leaders of one 
the most prominent resistance group, the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni 
People (MOSOP), including the leader Ken Saro Wiwa, were executed. Instead of 
stemming the conflict in the Niger Delta as the state had hoped, the execution of 
MOSOP leaders merely increased the opposition to political and economic 
oppression (Bischoff, 2010:43). The period after the late 1990s and especially after 
the transition to democratic rule saw the increase of militias fighting for the political 
and economic control of the Niger Delta. 
4.2.5.2 Third Republic (1999-Present) 
Numerous militant groups have arisen in the Niger Delta since the return to civilian 
rule in 1999. Most of them were organised along ethnic, regional or cultural lines, 
such as the Ijaw National Congress, the Egbesu Boys of Africa and The Atangbala 
Boys (Courson, 2009:14). The first organisation to transcend these divisions was the 
Movement for the Emancipation for the Niger Delta (MEND), which emerged at the 
end of 2005. 
Despite uniting various non-state warring factions of the Niger Delta, MEND is not a 
unified, coherent organisation. Instead, MEND acts more as an umbrella 
organisation for various dissident-groups in the Niger Delta. Jomo Gbomo, 
spokesperson of MEND, notes: “MEND is an amalgam of all arm bearing groups in 
the Niger Delta…”, and he continues by stating their objectives: “…fighting for the 
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control of oil revenue by indigenes of the Niger Delta who have relatively no benefits 
from the exploitation of our mineral resources by the Nigerian government and oil 
companies over the last fifty years (Gbomo quoted in Obi, 2009:122).” MEND 
attempts to achieve these objectives by using military force to attack the oil industry. 
During their first major attack in January 2006, MEND kidnapped foreigners who 
were involved in the oil extraction industry and held them for ransom. Since then 
kidnappings for ransom became a regular tactic of MEND. Other tactics include, 
attacks on MNOCs infrastructure (including offshore oilrigs, pipelines, production 
facilities, transport vessels and vehicles), attacks on Nigerian soldiers and on 
government buildings (BBC, 2011). 
Since the return to civilian rule in 1999, numerous efforts have been made by 
successive governments to resolve the conflict in the Niger Delta. Some of these 
initiatives include the establishing of the Niger Delta Development Board (1961), the 
Oil Minerals Producing Areas Development Commission (1992) and the Niger Delta 
Development Commission (2001) (Ibaba & Ikelgebe, 2010:27). In 2009 the 
government offered all militants an amnesty deal and a similar deal was offered in 
2010 by President Jonathan, both of which have failed to establish a viable end to 
the conflict (Risk Intelligence, 2010:2). Instead of addressing the root causes of the 
conflicts the government merely tries to buy off the militants in order to regain easy 
and uninterrupted access to oil supplies, which inevitably leads to the failure of these 
programs. 
4.3 Factors Contributing to Maritime Piracy 
The following section aims to identify the main factors attributing to piracy in the 
Niger Delta. Due to the interconnectedness of piracy and the militias, it is inevitable 
that some factors that lead to the conflict in the Niger Delta could also lead to 
maritime piracy in the region. As noted earlier, piracy is often an instrument used by 
militias to further their political or personal agendas. 
The main factors contributing to piracy in the Niger Delta includes the political 
marginalisation of the Niger Delta inhabitants, economic deprivation, corruption, 
ethnic conflict, environmental issues, social acceptability of piracy, ineffective 
security of the region and the favourable geography of the Niger Delta, increased 
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maritime traffic in the region, ransom demands that are being met and the easy 
access to weapons. 
4.3.1 Political Marginalisation 
The colonial legacy of political dominance by the major ethnic groups endured in the 
post-independence era. While the southern states were economically prosperous, 
the northern states enjoyed the greatest political power after independence. Most 
states in Nigeria were dominated by one of the three major ethnic groups, the 
Hausa-Fulani, the Igbos or the Yoruba. Those who held office were mainly from 
these ethnicities and distributed government funds according to their respective 
ethnic ties. This meant that the more than 140 minority groups which inhibit the Niger 
Delta had very little control over the revenues that were generated in their territory 
(Asuni, 2009:5).      
In a political system that is dominated by a majority, it is difficult for minority groups 
to effectively change the constitutional imbalance via legitimate means. Due to the 
strong hold on power and the advantages of said power, the majority group will be 
unlikely to willingly secede some of its power. 
One example where the northern states used their political power to their advantage 
was regarding the allocation of resources, often withholding resources. During the 
era that agriculture formed the greatest part of the economy, the fiscal policies 
favoured the states in which these products were obtained, i.e. the northern states. 
However, these fiscal policies do not apply to petroleum resources, which are 
considered to be a federal asset, and not belonging to those communities in which 
they are extracted, i.e. the Niger Delta (Akpan & Ering, 2010:149). The people of the 
Nigerian Delta perceive this to be an injustice and a source of grievance. 
4.3.2 Economic Deprivation 
As mentioned above, the allocation of government revenues is dominated by the 
central government and the majority groups which are in power and due to the 
marginalisation of minority groups this often leads to the underinvestment and 
underdevelopment of their regions. The minority groups of the Niger Delta perceives 
their situation particularly unjust, since the petroleum resources extracted in their 
region constitutes up to 80% of government revenues. 
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During the successive military regimes the percentage of oil revenues attributed to 
the Niger Delta states were increasingly adjusted downwards. While 50% was 
attributed to the oil producing states in 1966, the Niger Delta states’ share of oil 
revenues declined to as low as 1.5% during the 1990s (Obi, 2009:115). Added to this 
the increased costs of developing the region due to its swamp-like geography, it is 
clear why the region still lacks adequate infrastructure, why unemployment rates are 
high, and why high levels of poverty persist. After the return to civilian rule in 1999 
the oil producing states’ share of the revenue was increased to 13%, but this is still 
far from the 50% groups such as MEND demands (Obi, 2009: 116). 
Adding to the underdevelopment of the region is the lack of employment 
opportunities, especially for the youth, in the Niger Delta. Many of the youths who do 
get the education opportunities often have to go to other regions to receive their 
education. Upon their return to their homelands they have little employment 
opportunities. These youths often find the financial incentives posed by militia groups 
and their various activities such as piracy, bunkering, and kidnap for ransom 
attractive (Afinotan & Ojakorotu, 2009:195). Despite the size of the petroleum 
extraction industry and the numerous MNOCs involved in the Niger Delta, they pose 
few employment opportunities for the locals. The MNOCs often only employ highly 
educated people in specialised posts. These individuals are often foreigners who 
earn high salaries. It is easy to see why pirates predominantly kidnap foreigners to 
hold for ransom. The resentment towards these individuals as well as the high value 
placed on them by the MNOCs makes them attractive targets (Nodland, 2010:194).  
4.3.3 Corruption 
Adding to the economic woes of the Niger Delta is the extensive, institutionalised 
corruption that persists in Nigeria. Actors’ vying for political power in order to gain 
access to public funds for their personal enrichment started in the colonial era, but it 
was more significant after 1960. It is estimated that more than $380 billion dollars 
has either been stolen or wasted by Nigerian governments since independence 
(Courson, 2009:16). In addition it is estimated that 80% of the wealth generated by 
the petroleum industry in the Niger Delta only benefits 1% of the population. Most of 
this private wealth is invested abroad, as appose to Nigeria, which contributes to the 
underdevelopment of the country and the region (Obi, 2009: 124). 
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The rise of piracy in the Niger Delta is largely attributed to corrupt government 
officials and their involvement with illegal bunkering starting in the early 1990s. 
Bunkering is an expensive exercise that requires sophisticated equipment. Often, 
only the elites (mostly government officials) were able to supply this equipment as 
well as the political connections which allowed such activities to go unnoticed. These 
corrupt elites often supplied militias with the necessary weapons and vessels in 
order for them to siphon off fuel, which would then be sold on the black market 
(Ikelgebe, 2005:226). This practice not only ensured that militias have the necessary 
tools to engage in piratical acts, but they also gained the experience of operating in 
the maritime domain. Furthermore, militias also secured funds which they could use 
to expand their own operations. 
Interestingly, piratical attacks in the Niger Delta increased after the return to civilian 
rule in 1999. This is largely attributed to corrupt politicians who employed militias 
during their electoral campaigns to intimidate their opponents. After the elections, 
these skilled and armed militias were no longer needed by the politicians and they 
turned to other activities such as bunkering, kidnapping for ransom and piracy to fulfil 
their financial needs (Ibaba & Ikelgebe, 2010:13). 
4.3.4 Ethnic Conflict 
Another indirect manner in which corrupt politicians’ practice of hiring militias during 
elections led to an increase in piracy, was by fuelling ethnic rivalries. As noted 
earlier, militias are often organised along ethnic lines. The perceived favouring of 
one ethnic group over another by influential politicians led to increased ethnical 
tension. The competition to access the limited resources available to the Niger Delta 
inhabitants increased the conflict. The three most prominent groups in inter-ethnic 
fighting in the Delta were the Urhobos, the Itsekiris and the Ijaws (Asuni, 2009:11). 
This in turn led to more piracy as the militias needed to fund their inter-ethnic 
conflicts. 
Adding to the ethnic conflict and indirectly to the increase in piracy is the practice of 
MNOCs to pay off militias in order to gain their favour and possibly mitigating the risk 
of sabotage attacks. This in turn increased competition among various ethnic groups 
in the region, which in turn led to an increase in piracy to fund the conflict (Obi, 2009: 
124). 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
56 
 
4.3.5 Environmental Issues 
Environmental degradation caused by the oil extraction industry is one of the main 
motivations behind militant groups such as MEND. This issue is exaggerated by the 
fact that the Niger Delta populations receive few benefits while their livelihood is 
destroyed. Not only do militias use piracy and kidnapping for ransom as political 
tools to further their ideology, but fishermen and farmers increasingly turn to piracy 
as a financial source due to the destruction of their lifestyles caused by the 
environmental disasters. In Nigeria, similar to Somalia, the environmental issues is a 
legitimate cause for grievance which can be exploited by opportunists to indulge their 
greed. 
The Niger Delta is a delicate ecosystem containing freshwater swamp forest, 
mangrove forest, brackish swamp forest and lowland rainforests (Imoobe & Iroro, 
2009:56). Some of the ways in which the Niger Delta inhabitants benefit from the 
region is by picking medical herbs and bark, fish and shrimp, crabs and clams and 
collecting wood for energy and shelter (Afinotan & Ojakorotu, 2009:194). Due to the 
underdeveloped nature of the Niger Delta, the majority of inhabitants are either 
fisherman or agriculturalists and these resources are vital to their lifestyle. 
There are various ways in which the oil extraction industry contributes to the 
environmental degradation of the Niger Delta. Environmental degradation starts with 
the exploration of oil, when explosive mechanisms are used as well as chemicals 
which are harmful to the environment. Furthermore, the transportation of the 
extracted oil often leads to oil spills due to old or sabotaged infrastructure. Adding to 
this is the extensive networks of pipelines that transport the oil, which occupy great 
areas, denying locals access to agricultural land (Courson, 2009:9). It is estimated 
that up to 13 million barrels of oil have been spilled in the Niger Delta in the last five 
decades (Imoobe & Iroro, 2009:55). Additional damage is done to the environment 
by flaring – the process in which excess gasses are burned. This often leads to the 
occurrence of acid rain, which in turn destroys the fertile soil, as well as respiratory 
problems, especially among children (Courson, 2009:10; Ninic, 2009:6). 
Apart from environmental damage that endangers the livelihood of fisherman in the 
Niger Delta, the illegal commercial fishing also poses a risk. Although this seems to 
be a less prominent grievance of local militias and pirates, illegal fishing is still a 
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regular occurrence in the Niger Delta area. Together with illegal fishing, the practice 
of corrupt government officials selling fishing licenses illegally exaggerates the 
problem. Pirates often target Nigerian flagged, but foreign owned fishing vessels 
(Risk Intelligence, 2010:2). It is estimated that more than $350 million of revenue is 
lost each year due to illegal fishing in the region (Paterson, 2007:30). 
4.3.6 Social Acceptability of Piracy 
The increasing illegitimacy of the state and the breakdown of the social contract 
have led to the increase of militias, as well as piracy in the Niger Delta. According to 
Ibaba and Ikelegbe (2010:5) “the nature and character of the state and corporate 
governance have been so inequitable and unfair that violent appropriation of 
resources has become the norm.” Thus, since elections are almost always flawed 
and the state no longer fulfil its three basic functions (to maintain law and order, to 
facilitate development and to promote social welfare) to the people of the Niger 
Delta, they are looking at alternative actors as legitimate power (Ibaba & Ikelgebe, 
2010:23).  
Numerous militias have taken over functions that are usually associated with 
governments in their communities. These functions include obtaining drugs for 
hospitals, paying medical staff and teachers, providing energy by means of 
generators, awarding scholarships and paying school fees, providing potable water 
to citizens and providing financial assistance to entrepreneurs (Ibaba & Ikelgebe, 
2010:24). 
Although the locals might not approve of the high levels of violence and the methods 
in which these militias operate, they tolerate and in many cases even support them. 
Militias often claim to be freedom fighters, fighting for the political and economic 
freedom of the Niger Delta. In addition, militias provide an inflow of capital into the 
communities. This inflow of capital allows for the stimulation of local industries, 
creating employment opportunities for the locals. Thus it is often the case that locals 
would protect and provide militias with a safe haven, away from military forces 
(Asuni, 2009:12). 
Apart from support from local communities, organisations such as MEND have also 
been able to garner international attention in support of their aims against the state 
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and the MNOCs. They have done this through the widespread use of the internet, as 
well as communication with international media and taking journalists to their camps 
in the Niger Delta. Although they have gained some sympathy from international 
actors, some militias have become infamous for their threats of destroying the Niger 
Delta petroleum industry (Obi, 2009: 122).  
4.3.7 Ineffective Security and Favourable Geography 
Together with corrupt government officials and the protection from the Niger Delta 
inhabitants, piracy flourishes due to the inability of the Nigerian armed forces to 
effectively combat insurgency on land and in the maritime domain in the Niger Delta. 
This inability, coupled with the numerous rivers, creeks, swamplands and forests has 
enabled militias to successfully conduct piratical attacks in the region. 
Many militias in the Niger Delta rival the force of the Nigerian military. In 2006 
Nigeria’s military budget constituted only 1% of the Gross Domestic Product. The 
result is that the military often lack the necessary equipment to adequately deal with 
insurgents (Library of Congress, 2008:21). Furthermore, many of those involved in 
the military forces are hesitant to serve in the Niger Delta due to the high levels of 
violence and deaths of soldiers and police forces in the area (Nodland, 2010:196). 
Further weakening the land-based attempts to deal with militias and piratical 
activities is the lack of political will. According to IMB Director, Pottengal Mukundan, 
“unlike Somalia, Nigeria has an effective central government and the strongest navy 
in the region. What is worrying is the lack of political will to combat the problem of 
piracy off their coast… (Mukundan quoted in International Maritime Bureau, 2009).” 
Lastly, the religious conflict in the northern region of Nigeria has divided the focus, as 
well as the limited resources, of the military forces. 
Similar problems plague the attempts at curbing piracy in the maritime domain. The 
lack of financial resources and political will hamper anti-piracy efforts. Sophisticated 
equipment such as radars and communications gear, as well as adequate aerial 
surveillance is necessary for effective anti-piracy operations (Dunn, 2009:35). 
Although the figures vary, the Nigerian naval forces only have a small number of ill-
equipped naval vessels, as well as limited aviation capability and most of this 
equipment is badly maintained (Nodland, 2010:201; Library of Congress, 2008:21). 
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This lack of naval capability can largely be prescribed to the traditional focus on land-
based security (Gilpin, 2007). 
The natural geography of the Niger Delta is also conducive to piracy. Despite the 
numerous rivers, creeks, swamplands and forests, the Niger Delta also has 
numerous sections where vessels must navigate through constrained areas. Vessels 
have to navigate through strong currents and shifting mudflats which affect their 
speed. Due to the slow speeds at which these vessels travel, they are easy targets 
for pirates (Dunn, 2009:32). 
4.3.8 Increased Maritime Traffic 
Due to the rentier nature of the Nigerian economy, little has been done by the 
government in order to develop local industries. The result is that Nigeria has to 
import the majority of its commodities. This ensures that a high level of maritime 
trade and numerous vessels pass through Nigerian waters, which poses ample 
opportunities for pirates. 
An increase of interest in Nigerian petroleum reserves also leads to the increase in 
maritime traffic. Many countries have started to diversify their oil supplies in order to 
prevent wild fluctuations of oil prices. Instability in oil producing countries, such as 
the Spring 2010/2011 uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa, resulted in wildly 
fluctuating oil prices. Developed nations, specifically the United States, as well as 
emerging countries such as China and India has shown increasing interest in the 
petroleum reserves of countries in the Gulf of Guinea (Nodland, 2010:192). And 
since the majority of proved petroleum reserves are situated in the Niger Delta, an 
increase in maritime traffic to this region is to be expected (Ibaba & Ikelgebe, 
2010:27). 
4.3.9 Ransom 
Just as in Somalia, ransom demands are also often involved in piratical activities in 
Nigeria. Although Somali pirates often hold vessels and crews hostage, the pirates of 
the Niger Delta often only kidnap people and hold them hostage. However, in a 
similar fashion as in Somalia, as ransom demands are increasingly met, more 
potential pirates view this practice as a lucrative financial opportunity and the number 
of piratical incidents increase. Recent trends indicate that kidnappings for ransom 
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are on the increase, more than doubling between 2009 and 2010 (Risk Intelligence, 
2010:1). Also, as mentioned earlier, in the post-elections period illegal activities such 
as piracy and kidnapping for ransom increases due to the absence of politicians who 
support militias. 
The most prominent targets pirates aim to kidnap are foreign employees of MNOCs. 
While they are able to justify these actions to local communities in the Niger Delta by 
fronting the Niger Delta struggle, it is also a lucrative business. According to MEND, 
it does not kidnap people in exchange for financial rewards. Instead, according to the 
organisation, they kidnap people in order to apply political pressure on the 
government and MNOCs to adhere to their demands. However, since MEND is an 
umbrella organisation with various different factions, it is possible that some of these 
militias engage in kidnappings for ransom for personal enrichment (Bischoff, 2010:3). 
Furthermore, the distinction between the motivations for these actions, whether they 
are based on greed or grievance factors, becomes murky when people not related to 
MNOCs are abducted. Foreigners unrelated to MNOC and political elites have also 
been taken as hostages (Ehwarieme, 2009:95-99). 
4.3.10 Access to weapons 
Armed insurrection in the Niger Delta, despite the short-lived conflict during the 
1960s, only emerged during the 1990s. Since then various factors have led to the 
increase of weapons in the region. Already discussed is the ethnic rivalry that fuelled 
the arms race, as well as the various illegitimate practices that led to funding this 
arms race. The proliferation of arms plays an integral part in piracy in the Niger 
Delta, since pirates have superior firing power vis-à-vis their targets which mainly 
consist of vessels related to the oil extraction industry and fishing vessels. 
In addition to the ethnic-rivalries that fuel the arms race in the Niger Delta, is also the 
increasing presence of the military in the region. During the 1990s, peaceful and 
non-violent resistance from Niger Delta residents was increasingly met with violent 
suppression from the Nigerian security forces (Courson, 2009:14). In some cases, 
such as in Bayelsa state in 1999, whole villages were destroyed. It is estimated that 
almost 2500 people, mostly women and children, lost their lives in this particular 
incident (Courson, 2009:15). In another incident in 2006 in the village of Okerenkoko, 
military helicopters fired down indiscriminately on the villagers, leaving numerous 
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dead (Courson, 2009:21). As the military increased their troops and firepower in the 
region, the militants reacted in a similar manner to gain equal firepower vis-à-vis the 
military (Ibaba & Ikelgebe, 2010:11). 
Most of the arms in Nigeria come from smugglers in Guinea-Bissau, Cameroon, 
Gabon, Liberia and Sierra Leone. All of these countries have been involved in 
extensive periods of conflict during which time elaborate arms-trading networks have  
arisen. The weapons most often used include sophisticated assault rifles, rocket 
propelled grenades as well as explosives and grenades (Ikelgebe, 2005:228).  
This weapons build-up is difficult to stall, once it has engaged. With the amnesty deal 
in 2009 more than 8000 militants surrendered their weapons. However, the failure of 
the amnesty program inevitably led militias to rearm (Akpan & Ering, 2010:151). 
4.4 Modus Operandi 
Although the current situation in the Niger Delta is not as threatening to international 
trade as the piracy in Somalia, it still poses a great risk for the oil-economy of the 
world. By diversifying oil resources wild fluctuations in the prices of petroleum can be 
minimised. Piracy also threatens the economic welfare of Nigerian people due to the 
increasing costs involved in the import of commodities. Thus, viable short term 
solutions to counter piracy are needed. In order to achieve such solutions, the direct 
manifestation of piracy in the Niger Delta needs to be investigated. This will allow for 
more effective and efficient counter-piracy measures. 
The vessels pirates in the Niger Delta most commonly employ are speedboats. This 
greatly increases the pirate’s manoeuvring capabilities vis-à-vis their targets which 
are often large oil tankers or cargo ships. Furthermore, speedboats also allow for 
easy navigation through the myriad of rivers, creeks and swamplands that is the 
Niger Delta. Machine guns are often mounted on these speedboats (Obi, 2009: 105). 
In addition to the machineguns mounted on their speedboats, pirates in the Niger 
Delta are heavily armed with automatic and assault rifles and rocket propelled 
grenades launchers. Other equipment often employed includes radio communication 
devices, night-vision equipment and antiaircraft missiles (Obi, 2009: 105). 
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Pirates in the Niger Delta tend to target big, slow-moving ships such as oil tankers, 
supply ships, general cargo ships and container ships (Risk Intelligence, 2010:1). 
The most common practice among pirates is to kidnap workers on these vessels 
which they then use as bargaining tools to achieve their political goals (Bischoff, 
2010:3). Recent trends however, indicate that hostages are commonly held for 
ransom. This indicates that pirates are no longer only interested in political 
bargaining, but that financial gain has become a motivation for their activities. 
These criminal tendencies manifest in a similar fashion in the looting that is 
increasingly present during piratical activities, as well as the targeting of legal fishing 
vessels. The looting of vessels indicates the financial motives behind piracy. In a 
similar fashion, the attacking of legal fishing vessels, which has little to do with the 
political struggle in the Niger Delta, indicates that piracy is less concerned with 
political goals and more interested in the financial rewards involved in the activity 
(Ninic, 2009:7). 
Initially, foreign workers associated with the MNOCs were the main targets when 
pirates kidnapped victims. The political motives behind kidnapping these targets 
were clear. However, kidnapping victims have over time expanded to include expats 
unrelated to the MNOCs, Nigerian politicians and Nigerian elites. Although the 
kidnapping of politicians can further political goals, it is often not in line with the Niger 
Delta struggle. And once again, the indiscriminate kidnappings and making financial-
orientated ransom demands for the safe return of these hostages indicate the 
criminal motives behind the attacks or to gain funding to keep up the armed threat 
(Ehwarieme, 2009:98,99). 
According to Nodland (2010:197) there are three kinds of actors involved in maritime 
piracy in the region: piracy by political militias, piracy by criminals or piracy by 
community activists.  Together with above mentioned indications of criminalities, 
such definition of the motives behind piracy can aid in formulating better counter-
piracy initiatives, as well as developing solutions for the Niger Delta conflict. 
Contrary to Somalia, Nigerian pirates are more willing to act violently in order to 
achieve their goals. According to the IMB “the [pirate] attacks… [in the Niger Delta] 
are notable for the attackers’ willingness to use violence against crew members. In 
all of the most recent attacks reported to the IMB’s Piracy Reporting Centre the 
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heavily armed pirates, at the very least, threatened crew members with deadly 
weapons (International Maritime Bureau, 2009).” 
Pirate attacks most typically occur along the rivers of the Niger Delta and close to 
shore (Pham, 2011:3). The geography of the region favours the pirates since they 
can easily hide from suspecting targets as well as easily disappear after the attacks. 
Recently however, pirates have begun to launch attacks further out to sea. In one 
instance in 2008, MEND claimed responsibility for an attack on the Bonga oil 
platform. This facility, which was previously assumed to be well outside the striking 
distance of pirates, is located 120km off the Niger Delta coast (Courson, 2009:23). 
During the last decade religious conflict in the northern parts of Nigeria erupted due 
to the Muslim-dominated northern states adopting sharia law in their regions. There 
seems to be no connection between radical Islamist groups and piracy in the Niger 
Delta. This can largely be attributed to the great divide that exists between the 
Muslim-dominated northern states and the Niger Delta (Library of Congress, 
2008:23). 
One of the main objectives of militia groups and pirates such as those belonging to 
MEND is to disrupt oil production in order to pressure the Nigerian government and 
the MNOCs to adhere to their grievances. Often they launch attacks against 
(government or private) armed forces that protect oil producing facilities. 
Furthermore, pirates routinely “patrol” some of the rivers in order to prevent activities 
relating to the oil industry (Ibaba & Ikelgebe, 2010:9). It should be noted that these 
“patrols” are not considered to be acts of piracy. Piracy only occurs when attacks are 
launched against other vessels. 
4.5 Current Anti-Piracy Efforts 
Pirates in the Niger Delta have received much less international attention than their 
counterparts in Somalia. While piracy in Somalia threatens international trade which 
affects all countries, piracy in the Niger Delta largely only affects the Nigerian 
government, Nigerian citizens and the United States directly. The Nigerian state 
experiences financial losses due to the politically unstable climate while Nigerian 
citizens experience increasing economic hardship due to the rising costs of imported 
commodities.  Meanwhile the import of oil to the US, which is Nigeria’s largest oil 
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exporter, could experience a shortage of petroleum reserves. Consequently, unlike 
in Somalia where there is widespread participation in the naval forces ensuring a 
safe maritime environment, anti-piracy efforts in the Niger Delta is largely driven by 
the Nigerian government and the US. 
Two of the initiatives that the Nigerian government have often used in an attempt to 
pacify the region is the amnesty and development programs. The latest attempt of an 
amnesty program was initiated by the former President Yar’Adua in October 2009. 
This initiative included the disarmament, demobilisation, rehabilitation and the 
reintegration of militias. More than 17000 militiamen accepted this offer (Ibaba & 
Ikelgebe, 2010:28). This amnesty program, as well as most previous development 
programs, failed. Often these initiatives aim to pacify the region in order for the state 
and MNOCs to gain uninterrupted access to the oil reserves and they neglect the 
underlying factors of the conflict in the Niger Delta (Courson, 2009:23). 
This failure of the Nigerian government to adequately address the underlying 
conditions of the Niger Delta conflict was illustrated in the allocation of funds in the 
2008 budget of the Nigerian state. While ₦69 billion was allocated to the 
development of the region, ₦444 billion was allocated to security in the Niger Delta 
(Courson, 2009:23). This indicates the increasing oppressive attitude favoured by 
the Nigerian government. The most prominent of the security operations in the Niger 
Delta is the Joint Task Force, which aims to combat insurgency in the region and 
includes elements from the army, the navy, the air force, as well as civil security 
forces (Garuba, 2010:12).  
As already noted, the United States aims to diversify their sources of oil exports in 
order to minimise overreliance on Middle Eastern oil which aims to reduce wild 
fluctuations in oil prices. An increased interest in oil exports from African countries 
led to the creation of the US Africa Command (AFRICOM) under the Bush 
administration in 2007 (Nodland, 2010:202). AFRICOM is increasingly involved in 
security operations in the Niger Delta, protecting oil facilities and inspecting incoming 
maritime traffic in the region. In addition to their increased physical presence in the 
Niger Delta, AFRICOM also assist the Nigerian armed forces in offshore 
surveillance, providing training to the naval forces, as well as providing equipment to 
support the anti-piracy efforts (Akpan & Ering, 2010:152). 
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4.6 Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter was to give a brief overview of the political, economic 
and social issues that have shaped modern Nigeria, as well as to identify the direct 
causes of maritime piracy in Nigeria. 
It has been identified that the historical events that have shaped modern Nigeria has 
had a significant impact in the contemporary issue of maritime piracy. The regional 
division that was created under colonial rule still has a great impact on contemporary 
politics. Furthermore, conditions under colonial rule allowed for the institutionalisation 
of corruption in Nigeria, which contributes greatly to piracy, directly and indirectly. 
Although piracy was largely contained during the post-independence period, it has 
resurfaced as a major issue since the 1990s. It has been identified that conflict in the 
Niger Delta and the militias involved in this conflict are the main actors in piratical 
activities. 
Numerous direct causes of piracy in Nigeria have been identified in this study. The 
direct causes include the political marginalisation of the Niger Delta people and the 
economic deprivation they experience. Other direct causes include the 
institutionalised corruption and the ethnic conflict in the Niger Delta. The 
environmental degradation caused by the oil extraction industry has led to the great 
support of pirates by local populations, which has increased the local legitimacy of 
piratical activities. Pirates in the Niger Delta have benefited greatly from the lack of 
security in the region, while the geography of the Niger Delta has allowed them to 
easily engage in piratical activities. Furthermore, the increasing amounts of ransoms 
that have been paid out have encouraged more would be pirates to engage in 
piratical activities. Lastly, the easy access to weapons in the region has allowed 
pirates great firepower vis-à-vis their targets, making their attacks easier and more 
violent. 
In accordance with the secondary objectives set out in this study, this chapter 
focussed on the modus operandi of pirates, as well as current initiatives to counter 
piracy. It has been found that Nigerian pirates rely greatly on the geography of the 
Niger Delta when engaging in piratical activities. Unlike in Somalia, it is evident that 
piracy in Nigeria has not attracted as much attention and the current counter-piracy 
activities are very limited. 
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CHAPTER 5 – Comparative Analysis 
5.1 Introduction 
The political, economic, social and environmental factors that relates to the causes 
and factors attributing to maritime piracy in Somalia and Nigeria has been 
extensively documented in the preceding two chapters. This chapter aims, with the 
aid of a comparative analysis framework, to investigate the similarities and 
differences of maritime piracy of the two case studies. As indicated in the 
introduction, this study takes an inductive reasoning approach. Thus, significant 
insight into piracy and the correlations between piracy in Somalia and Nigeria will 
only be evident upon completion of this chapter 
The objectives identified in the introductory chapter of this study regard the relation 
between maritime piracy in Somalia and Nigeria. The two primary objectives of this 
study is to investigate the correlations between state functionality in Somalia and 
Nigeria and how state capabilities impact on maritime piracy, as well as the 
motivations for piracy - whether they are greed or grievance orientated. 
The secondary objectives set out in this study included investigating the direct 
manifestations of piracy in Somalia and Nigeria, as well as evaluating the current 
counter-piracy initiatives in place, in order to devise viable short-term solutions  that 
counter maritime piracy. 
5.2 Political Regime and Maritime Piracy 
From the two case studies it is evident that one of the most significant differences 
between Somalia and Nigeria which directly affects the maritime piracy situation 
regards the political stability or lack thereof. It has been noted that Somalia has had 
no central governance authority for the last two decades that enjoyed widespread 
domestic and international legitimacy. Instead, various regions of the country have 
been run by different warring factions. Somalia is often classified as a “failed” state. 
In contrast to this, Nigeria has a central government. However, it should be noted 
that the Nigerian government is consistently described as “weak” due to the lack of 
legitimacy in notably the Niger Delta region, as well as due to the endemic, 
institutionalised corruption. 
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This distinction between “failed” and “weak” states is helpful in explaining why 
Somalia pirates can hijack vessels and keep them for ransom for months, while 
Nigerian pirates often only loot vessels or kidnap the passengers. The lack of any 
central authority allows Somali pirates to mobilise and operate from enclaves. After 
hijacking vessels Somali pirates can dock them in these enclaves without fear of 
prosecution from authorities, while they are negotiating a ransom with the ship 
owners. Nigerian pirates are not afforded this opportunity. The resistance of 
government forces will make it extremely difficult for Nigerian pirates to hide vessels, 
especially large vessels like oil tankers or cargo ships. The kidnapping of 
passengers on board vessels and keeping them for ransom is a much more practical 
option for Nigerian pirates. While the financial or political rewards for kidnapped 
passengers are much smaller than can be accrued by hijacking entire vessels, it is 
more practical for Nigerian pirates. 
Although it is not the only contributing factor, the distinction between “failed” and 
“weak” states is also helpful in explaining why maritime piracy is much more 
prevalent in Somalia than in Nigeria. Once again, while the actions of Nigerian 
pirates are to some extent constrained by the state, Somali pirates do not experience 
similar restraints. Instead, the international community has to act in Somali waters to 
stem piratical activities. The efforts of the international community however, are often 
hampered by legal restrictions due to the sovereignty of the Somali state. 
In both countries ineffective security on land and in the maritime spheres contributes 
greatly to the occurrence of piracy. However, the sources of ineffective security in 
Somalia and Nigeria are different. While the main source of insecurity in Somalia can 
be attributed to the lack of a central government, ineffective security in Nigeria is 
largely due to the lack of political will to address these issues, as well corruption. 
While a domestic solution to insecurity in Somalia seems unlikely, the Nigerian state 
has the capacity to address the issues. Despite revenues from the petroleum 
extraction industry ensuring that Nigeria is potentially one of the wealthiest African 
countries, the lack of political will to address the conflict in the Niger Delta hampers 
the effective curtailment of piracy. This view is supported by the IMB Director, 
Pottengal Mukundan, who claims that “unlike Somalia, Nigeria has an effective 
central government and the strongest navy in the region. What is worrying is the lack 
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of political will to combat the problem of piracy off their coast… (International 
Maritime Bureau, 2009).” 
5.3 Greed or Grievance 
Whether the motivation for conflict, in this case piratical attacks, emanates from 
perceived injustices (i.e. grievance factors) or for personal gain (i.e. greed factors) is 
relevant to the discussion on maritime piracy in Somalia and Nigeria. 
As observed in both case studies, there are legitimate causes of concern among 
Somalis and the inhabitants of the Niger Delta. Illegal commercial fishing and the 
illegal dumping of toxic chemicals in Somalia endangered the lifestyles of a sizeable 
portion of the population. Similarly the extensive environmental degradation caused 
by the oil extraction industry has had similar effects on the lifestyles of the 
inhabitants in the Niger Delta. In both countries pirates claim to act in the best 
interest of the people by combating these injustices. And although the populations do 
not always agree with their actions or methods, they sympathise with the pirates. 
During the initial stages of piracy in Somalia the main targets of pirates were illegal 
commercial fishing vessels. Similarly, kidnappings of foreign oil workers by Nigerian 
pirates in return for political concessions were common during the initial period of 
piracy in Nigeria. However, as piracy in these two countries progressed and 
developed targets not only included illegal fishing vessels or employees of MNOCs. 
Instead pirates in Somalia pirated ships indiscriminately, whether they were linked to 
illegal fishing or not. And the kidnapping victims of pirates in Nigeria were no longer 
only employees from MNOCs, but included Nigerian politicians and Nigerian elites. 
However, the most significant action by Nigerian pirates that indicate greed 
motivations for conflict, as appose to grievance motivations, was the financial 
rewards associated with the safe return of kidnapping victims. While pirates who 
merely demanded political concessions in return for kidnapping victims could claim 
to act on their grievances, the exchanging of victims for financial rewards indicates 
that the motivation for these actions would rather be greed orientated. 
A counter argument can be made that although Nigerian pirates gain financial 
incentives from kidnappings, it can be justified by the financial injustices done to 
them by the MNOC and the state. It can be argued that inhabitants of the Niger Delta 
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are not properly compensated for the environmental damage occurred to their region 
by the oil extraction industry and that financial gain from kidnappings can be 
considered as an alternative form of financial compensation for the populations of 
the Niger Delta. However, this argument is defunct when the victims of Nigerian 
pirates include those who are not directly involved in the oil extraction industry. 
Thus, to conclude, initially the factors behind maritime piracy in Somalia and Nigeria 
might have been driven by legitimate grievances, but as piracy progressed and 
developed these grievance motivations were transcended and trends indicate that 
the main motivation for piracy in these two regions are dominated by greed. 
5.4 Similarities 
Together with the debate on the legitimate environmental grievances of pirates, one 
has to discuss the other economic grievances between the populations of the two 
regions. It has been identified that the environmental degradation caused by external 
actors has a real possibility of endangering the lifestyles of not only the pirates, but 
most citizens in Somalia and Nigeria. This threat to their lifestyle, coupled with the 
widespread poverty, unemployment and overall low living standards leaves these 
populations desperate. 
Taking into account the desperate situations most people are in, it is not surprising 
that they often support pirates. From the case studies it is evident that in Somalia 
and Nigeria the influx of capital emanating from piratical acts are welcomed by the 
local populations. The influx of capital creates economic opportunity for local 
communities, which in turn leads to the creation of employment opportunities. In 
addition to this, the pirates also seem to garner support from local communities by 
fulfilling roles that the state cannot provide or has neglected. While Somali pirates 
often pays Qaaraan, a sort of social welfare, to the local people, the Nigerian militias 
in some cases provide financial support for medications, education and energy 
generation. 
One of the significant contributing factors towards increased piracy in both countries 
has been the clan- and ethnic conflicts. In both Somalia and Nigeria these conflicts 
has created arms races. In response to this, more actors took to piracy to increase 
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their financial means in order to gain access to weapons to compete with rival 
factions. This in turn contributed to the increase in piracy. 
When ship owners or MNOCs are faced with losing their vessels, its cargo and their 
crewmembers or their employees, they often give in to ransom demands. Although 
their response seems logical, it sets a dangerous precedent. The more piratical 
attempts that end successfully, the more would-be pirates engage in similar activities 
in order to reap similar rewards. Thus, the paying of ransoms ensures a snowball 
effect which increases the problem of piracy and makes the regions more dangerous 
for other seafarers.  
Interestingly, the Nigerian militias have made widespread use of technology, 
especially the internet, to raise awareness about the environmental degradation 
caused by the oil extraction industry. MEND have often interacted with the media, 
releasing press statements and granting interviews. Although MEND might have 
succeeded in gaining sympathy for their cause, most people might not support the 
methods they employ to achieve their goals. The use of technology to garner 
sympathy for their cause is not often employed by the Somali pirates. A possible 
explanation for this is due to the country’s lack of infrastructure that such actions 
would necessitate. 
One possible explanation for the different methods employed by pirates regarding 
capturing vessels for ransom and merely kidnapping victims has been attributed to 
the different political natures of the states (failed and weak). An alternative theory 
suggests that the lack of infrastructure in Somalia prevents pirates from looting 
vessels. In order to successfully loot a vessel, the necessary infrastructure needs to 
be in place to transport the goods, as well as markets to sell the stolen goods to. 
While the lack of infrastructure cannot be circumvented, the unavailability of markets 
can be addressed by exporting these products via maritime vessels to other regions. 
However, this poses more problems in accruing the appropriate tools and 
equipment. 
Even though piracy in Nigeria has long been considered to be the hotspot of piracy 
in Africa, media and academic attention seems to be much more focused on piracy 
in Somalia. Two possible explanations can be presented for this trend. Firstly, piracy 
in Somalia is more prevalent than in Nigeria. While 196 piratical incidents were 
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recorded in the Gulf of Aden and Somalia during 2010, only 19 incidents were 
incidents were recorded during the same time in Nigeria (IMB, 2010:6). Secondly, 
while the negative effects of piracy in Nigeria is largely contained to the Nigerian 
state, MNOCs and the local populace, piracy in Somalia affects almost all nations, 
corporations and citizens in the world. Due to the high volume of maritime traffic via 
the Suez Canal, numerous actors are affected negatively. The rise in transportation 
costs due to an increase in insecurity will eventually place an additional burden on all 
the actors involved in consumption of the goods passing through these routes. 
Although a strategic location is not the only factor to consider when considering other 
areas where piracy might possibly flare up, it plays a significant role in piracy in 
Somalia and Nigeria. While Somalia is situated along one of the busiest trading 
routes between Europe and Asia, the Niger Delta, situated in the Gulf of Guinea is a 
key trading route for petroleum resources. The high amount of traffic through these 
regions allows pirates plentiful opportunities for piratical acts. In addition, the 
geography of the Niger Delta (numerous rivers, creeks, swamplands and forests) 
has been favourable for piratical activities, as well as increased the ease with which 
militias can carry out such activities. 
5.5 Modus Operandi 
The methods employed by pirates in Somalia and Nigeria differ significantly. What is 
clear is that they often employ methods and use equipment with which they are 
familiar. 
In both Somalia and Nigeria the crafts most often employed by pirates are small, 
agile and fast vessels, such as skiffs with high powered engines or speedboats. This 
allows them to easily outmanoeuvre their targets which are often big, slow-moving 
vessels. In addition, the crafts used by Somali pirates easily blend into their 
environment, looking very similar to those used by local fisherman, offering 
additional coverage. Also, in the case of Nigerian pirates, these speedy vessels 
allow them to escape easily into the myriad of rivers, creeks and swamplands of the 
Niger Delta.  
In both Somalia and Nigeria access to weapons has played an instrumental part in 
the modus operandi of pirates. In both case studies, protracted conflicts in the 
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country or the region have ensured established weapon-trading routes which ensure 
easy access to sophisticated weapons. In almost all piratical incidents, pirates have 
superior firepower since most vessels are only armed with non-lethal deterrents. 
Despite the significantly higher number of piratical attacks in Somalia than in Nigeria 
during 2010, piratical attacks in Somalia were much less violent. While only 13 
citizens got injured out of 196 incidents in Somalia, 15 people got injured during the 
19 attacks carried out in Nigeria in the same time (IMB, 2010:11). An explanation for 
this occurrence is not immediately available and more research needs to be done in 
order to explain this phenomenon. 
If we regard the milieu in which pirates operate, we once again note a marked 
difference. While Somali pirates make use of motherships to allow them to attack as 
far out as Seychelles and the coasts of Oman and India, piracy in Nigeria is largely 
contained in the Niger Delta area. One explanation for this phenomenon is that 
Nigerian pirates takes full advantage of the coverage provided for them by the 
environment of the Niger Delta while Somali pirates takes advantage of the vastness 
(and therefore difficult to police) of the Indian Ocean. 
From the available data it is clear that there is a marked difference in the 
organisational structure of pirates in Somalia and Nigeria. While the organisational 
structure of Somali pirates closely resembles that of large, organised criminal 
groups, Nigerian pirates tend to be organised into smaller groups which are closely 
related to the militias. 
One of these aspects in which Somali pirates resemble the organisation of large 
criminal groups, is by the clear division of labour employed. This is also evident from 
the way in which they fund, organise and distribute the financial rewards of their 
operations. However, from the case study it is clear that very little is known about the 
organisational structure. More primary research needs to be done on this topic. This 
will allow for more effective measures against these organisations, for example by 
implementing targeted sanctions on the leaders of these organisations. 
5.6 Counter Piracy 
In both case studies the counter-piracy measures that are in place has been 
discussed. One of the biggest criticisms in both cases was the dedication towards 
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curbing piracy at sea while largely neglecting the land-based issues that gave rise to 
piracy. While little has been done to address the land-based political, economic and 
social issues of Somalis (apart from the ineffective UNOSOMI and UNOSOMII), the 
lack of political will in Nigeria has hampered the progress in addressing similar 
issues Nigerians have. 
What is noticeable is the great extent to which international forces are present to 
combat Somali piracy, but it is almost non-existent in Nigeria (apart from the US). 
This can largely be ascribed to the actors which are affected by piracy in these 
areas. It has been noted that while Somali piracy affects an extensive number of 
actors the negative effects of Nigerian piracy is largely limited to the US, the Nigerian 
state, MNOCs and Nigerians. Also, the greater number of piratical incidents in 
Somalia and surrounding areas warrants a greater response. 
During 2010 more than 50 warships from numerous international organisations, as 
well as independent navies were patrolling the areas around Somalia in order to 
combat piracy. Although the number of piratical attacks has declined, the area that 
these warships have to cover is still too great and piracy continues. It would be 
interesting to see whether or not counter piracy measures would be more effective if 
they employed similar methods to those used by the pirates. Often the big warships, 
despite providing aerial support with helicopters, are too slow to act against pirate 
attacks that take place. Instead, if they used warships as “motherships” and 
deployed numerous smaller, more agile and faster craft, they would be able to cover 
greater distances, have a greater presence in the area as well as being able to 
respond quicker to piracy situations. 
One of the most common themes regarding piracy in Africa is the connection 
between pirates and radical Islamic terrorists. Although the danger posed by the 
cooperation of pirates and Jihadist terrorists is great, no definitive links has yet been 
found between Jihadist terrorists and pirates in either Somalia or Nigeria. 
5.7 Piracy in Africa 
This study has identified numerous historical and direct causes of maritime piracy in 
Somalia and Nigeria. This assessment could assist in possibly identifying other 
regions in Africa where piracy could flare up. Some of these regions might include 
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other states in the Gulf of Guinea, given the increasing activity relating to oil 
extraction. Another possibility could be North African region, given the current 
political instability regarding the Arab Spring 2010/2011. However, accurate 
forecasts will only be possible after doing similar analysis of other African countries 
that was done in this study. Lastly, in order to identify whether these causes that 
were identified in this study are unique to Africa or common for piracy across the 
globe, more research needs to be done.  
5.8 Future Studies 
This study has identified numerous causes of maritime piracy in Somalia and 
Nigeria. From this assessment it is evident that these causes developed over an 
extended period of time. It will be impossible to resolve most of these issues in the 
short term. However, as stressed earlier, maritime piracy poses a grave threat to 
international trade. Therefore, viable and effective short term solutions need to be 
found. In order to do this, more research needs to be done on the modus operandi of 
pirates. This will allow for more effective counter measures. 
Furthermore, a great deal of attention is being paid to combatting piracy in the 
maritime domain. However, the majority of the causes identified in this study indicate 
that the origins of piracy are due to land based issues. Therefore, more research 
needs to be done on how to combat these land based issues, in order to have viable 
solutions to piracy. 
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CHAPTER 6 – Conclusion 
6.1 Conclusion 
This study concerned the piratical attacks occurring along the East and West coasts 
of Africa. Although maritime piracy along the coasts of Africa is not a new 
phenomenon, recent upsurges in piratical attacks have attracted a great deal of 
attention. Despite Nigeria being long considered as the hotspot for piratical activity in 
Africa, the greatest upsurge of piracy has been seen in the areas surrounding 
Somalia, including the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean. 
From the literature review it was evident that many factors had an influence in the 
causes of maritime piracy in these regions. The root causes of maritime piracy in 
these regions had their origins in the various political, economic, social and 
environmental insecurities that were evident in the countries. By employing a 
comparative analysis framework, it was possible to analyse the similarities and 
differences between these various factors in Somalia and Nigeria, as well as the root 
causes of piracy. 
However, before it was possible to analyse the similarities and differences between 
the two states, it was necessary to construct a relevant framework for the study, as 
well as discussing the numerous theoretical frameworks that would be applicable. 
The primary objectives of this study were to investigate the correlation between state 
functionality (i.e. failed or weak) and piracy, as well as investigating the greed versus 
grievance framework in relation to piratical activities in Somalia and Nigeria. 
The third and fourth chapters of this study constituted the case studies of piracy in 
Somalia and Nigeria, respectively. In the case study of Somalia it became evident 
that the causes of piracy in this country had its roots in the historical development of 
the country. Although these causes did not necessarily start with the colonisation 
and the actions by post-independence leaders, the actions of these actors played a 
significant role in the contributing factors of contemporary piratical activity. 
The more immediate factors that attribute to maritime piracy in Somalia included the 
country’s strategic position, the current political instability, environmental degradation 
due to illegal fishing and dumping which often contributed to already existing 
economic deprivation. Furthermore, the lack of effective security, the easy access to 
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weapons and technology and the social acceptability of their acts had a huge effect 
on escalating piracy. Lastly, the increasing number and the increasing size of 
ransoms being paid out created a snowball effect which made the business 
extremely lucrative. 
The secondary objectives of this study, as stated in the introduction included 
investigating the physical manifestations of pirates, as well as contemporary anti-
piracy efforts. This was done in order to create more viable counter piracy initiatives 
to deal with the immediate threat piracy poses to international trade. In the case of 
Somalia it became evident that pirates often employ the same methods that they 
have been using for decades in order to procure fish. Furthermore, it was discovered 
that despite the great international naval presence in the waters surrounding 
Somalia, piratical activity was not necessarily stemmed; it merely spread out 
throughout the Indian Ocean. 
From Chapter 4, the case study on Nigeria, it became evident that colonisation and 
the actions of post-independence leaders also had a significant contribution to the 
causes of contemporary piracy. The most enduring legacy of the colonial era in 
modern-day Nigeria was corruption. The legacy of corruption, together with the great 
spoils brought along by the oil-extraction industry has led to the lack of political will 
by political elites to address the grievances of the populace, especially in the oil-rich 
Niger Delta states. 
Other factors present in Nigeria that contributes more directly to contemporary piracy 
included the political marginalisation of the Niger Delta people, the economic 
deprivation experienced by these people, the on-going endemic corruption and the 
ethnic conflict between various ethnic groups in the Niger Delta. Furthermore, the 
devastating environmental damaged, caused by the oil-extraction industry, threatens 
the lifestyles of the populations situated in the Niger Delta, while the people are not 
adequately compensated for their losses. These perceived grievances often lead to 
the social acceptability of piracy as these people feel that they are being treated 
unjustly. Lastly, the lack of political will of Nigerian leaders to effectively combat 
piracy has led to ineffective security, which combined with the geography, have led 
to increased piratical activities. 
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Regarding the modus operandi in Nigeria, it is evident that it differs from Somalia. 
While Nigerian pirates also make use of small, fast crafts, as well as sophisticated 
weapons, they seem to be much more violent than their Somali counterparts. Pirates 
in Nigeria also take great advantage of the environment in which they operate. The 
myriad of rivers, creeks and swamplands that is the Niger Delta makes for difficult 
navigation for large, slow moving vessels, making them easy targets and it also 
assist pirates in escaping easily. Thus, piracy in Nigeria is limited to the Niger Delta 
and the coastal waters. 
Contrary to the great international naval presence in the waters surrounding 
Somalia, counter piracy operations in Nigeria is almost exclusively the domain of the 
United States Navy and the Nigerian Navy. While Somali piracy threatens 
international trade (maritime traffic operating between the East and Europe via the 
Suez Canal), piracy in Nigeria largely affects only the Nigerian state and its people 
and the United States (due to their extensive involvement in the oil-extraction 
industry). This explains the lack of involvement by other international navies. 
The most significant part of this study is concentrated in the second to last chapter, 
Chapter 5. This chapter extensively investigates the comparison of the two case 
studies. From this chapter it is evident that there is a relation between the efficiency 
of a regime (i.e. weak or failed) and maritime piracy. While it is common for pirates in 
failed states to capture vessels and hold them for ransom, the presence of a central 
government (albeit weak one) ensures that pirates cannot hold vessels at random. 
Instead, they have to kidnap their victims and instead hold them for ransom. 
Furthermore, in Chapter 5 it has been established that populations in both Somalia 
and Nigeria had legitimate grievances. However, it has also been established that 
while pirates initially might have been acting on these legitimate grievances, their 
involvement in piracy eventually went beyond fighting these injustices. The financial 
rewards of piracy is great and it seems that most contemporary pirates are more 
concerned with the financial rewards than fighting the grievances the populations 
have. 
This study has identified numerous historical and direct causes of maritime piracy in 
the two regions of Africa where piracy is the most prevalent. This can be useful in 
identifying possible future regions where piracy might flare up. 
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Lastly, this study has also identified possible avenues for future research. Although it 
has been identified that the long term solutions to combat piracy necessitate more 
intensive land-based approaches, it is necessary to further investigate the modus 
operandi of contemporary pirates in order to find more viable short term solutions. 
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